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I. INTRODUCTION
When Boeing announced its plans to purchase McDonnell Douglas in
1996, little did the two American corporations realize that the biggest
anti-trust hurdle to their planned merger would not come from the
United States Federal Trade Commission, but rather, the European
Commission.' On July 1, 1997, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
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1. The European Commission is the central European Union (EU) institution,
which is responsible for both the formulation of policy initiatives, and for ensuring that
the EU Member States fulfill their obligations under EU treaties. As the "executive" of
the EU, the Commission must also apply particular rules in certain areas, including
competition and mergers. There are twenty Commissioners, two each from France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K., and one each from the ten smaller states.
Commission members agree to work for the general interest of the EU as a whole, and to
be "completely independent" of their state. See Derek W. Urwin, From a Europe of
States to a State of Europe? in THE EUROPEAN UNION HANDBOOK 3, 16-18 (Philippe
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approved the takeover unconditionally by a four-to-one vote, ruling that
the merger would not "substantially lessen competition in any relevant
market."2 However, three days later on July 4, the European Union's
(EU) Antitrust Advisory Committee virtually ignored the FTC's
decision and recommended that the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
merger be blocked on the grounds that the merger would harm fair
trade.' On July 10, just thirteen days before the European Commission's
deadline for approval, a spokesperson for Karel Van Miert, the European
Competition Commissioner, reiterated that the merger would not be
approved unless Boeing came up with satisfactory concessions to
address the European Commission's concerns over the merger.'
The growing dispute led to threats of retaliation and sanctions by the
United States if the EU did not approve the merger. Tensions between
the two entities rose to such a point that President Clinton had to
personally intervene "at the eleventh hour to head off one of the most
bruising trade disputes between Europe and the United States in recent
years." After intense private negotiations and public acrimony, the
Barbour ed., 1996). See also TE EuRoPFAN UNION HANDBOOK, supra, at 303.
2. John-Thor Dahlburg, Europe Panel Rejects Boeing Merger Plan, L.A. TIMES,
July 5, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Dahlburg, Europe Panel Rejects]. See also Karen West,
EU Panel Rejects Boeing Merger, SnATrnE POST-INTMLLIGENCER, July 17, 1997, at C1
[hereinafter West, EU Panel].
3. See Eu Panel, supra note 2. European officials stated that the FTC approval of
the merger was irrelevant to their ruling. See Dahlburg, Europe Panel Rejects, supra
note 2. The advisory committee found that the merger would reinforce Boeing's
"existent dominant position and therefore should be prohibited." The reason, according
to one EU official, was because the committee decided that Boeing's willingness to
modify its long-term contracts which bound three U.S. airlines (American, Delta, and
Continental) to buy only Boeing planes, was "not sufficient" to meet the EU's concerns
in preventing Boeing from gaining too large a share of the commercial airliner market.
Id.
4. See Merger Control: Boeing Working Towards Accommodation with European
Commission, EUR. REP., July 12, 1997, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Ecnews
File. The spokesperson stated that the concessions must be "structural" remedies, which
he explained would include: Boeing selling off parts of the merged company's
manufacturing business, licensing some of its technology, and renouncing the exclusive
contracts with major U.S. airlines. Id. See also Karen West, Boeing Intensifies Merger
Negotiations With EU, SEATLE POST-IN BLLIGENCER, July 11, 1997, at B 1.
5. See Steven Pearlstein & Anne Swardson, U.S. Gets Tough to Ensure Boeing,
McDonnell Merger; Retaliation Plan in Works as Europe Threatens, WASH. POST, July
17, 1997, at Cl. See also West, EU Panel, supra note 2. Rep. Norm Dicks of
Washington State where Boeing is located stated: "We could be heading for a major
trade war with the EU over this .... If they make unrealistic demands, the United States
government is going to have to retaliate." Id. See also Karen West, Boeing Gets
Working on EU to Take Merger, SAiTrLE POST-ITELLiGENCER, July 9, 1997, at B5
(hereinafter West, Boeing]. A senior U.S. trade official said that the U.S. could file a
complaint against the EU with the World Trade Organization by declaring any fine
against Boeing an illegal tariff, as well as impose sanctions on products from individual
EU nations. See id.
6. Ralph Vartabedian & John-Thor Dahlburg, European Union OKs Boeing Deal
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European Commission finally approved Boeing's takeover, but only
after Boeing agreed to numerous concessions and conditions,7 which will
be discussed below.
During the height of the dispute, several lawmakers, as well as the
general public, questioned why the EU even had the right to approve or
disapprove a merger between two American corporations.' This
With McDonnell, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1997, at Al. See also Peter Kaplan & Lorraine
Woellert, EU Won't Fight Boeing-McDonnell Merger, WASH. TIMES, July 24, 1997, at
B7. President Clinton personally lobbied European officials during the final days before
the European Commission decision. Id. Clinton also put pressure on the Commission by
publicly threatening to go to the World Trade Organization if the EU moved against the
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merger, and hinted at retaliatory sanctions against the
EU as well. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Warns Europeans of Trade Complaint on
Boeing Deal, N.Y. TIMEs, July 18, 1997, at D2. See also Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust
Regulation Across National Borders: The United States of Boeing versus the European
Union ofAirbus, 16 BROOKINGS REV. 30, 30 (1998).
7. See Commission Approves Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger, EUR. REP.,
Aug. 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Ecnews File; Merger Control:
Boeing Merger Approval Points up Lessons for Regulators and Industry, EUR. REP.,
July 26, 1997, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Ecnews File [hereinafter Merger
Control]; Karen West, Final Hurdle Cleared as EU Approves Deal, SEATILE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, July 31, 1997, at Cl. See also Eleanor M. Fox, Lessons From Boeing: A
Modest Proposal to Keep Politics Out of Antitrust, [1997] Antitrust Rep. (MB) 19 (Nov.
1997), for a discussion of the "political escalation" of tensions between the U.S. and EU,
and the reasons for the politicization of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger.
8. See Lorraine Woellert & Peter Kaplan, EU Fears Could Hinder Boeing-
McDonnell Move, WASH. TIMES, July 8, 1997, at B6. In response to the Senate's outrage
towards what lawmakers saw as the EU's interference with a deal between two
American companies, the Senate Commerce Committee was, at the time, initiating plans
to hold hearings on the matter in late July 1997. See id. According to one Commerce
Committee aide, "A lot of the (Commerce) committee members feel like it's pretty
presumptuous for the EU to intervene at this point." Id. See also Kaplan & Woellert,
supra note 6. In the House, more than one hundred members voted to send a letter to the
President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, declaring that the EU's position
was "unacceptable." Id. However, according to EU law, the European Commission
does have authority to review the merger. Under the Merger Regulation which took
effect in 1990, the Member States granted the European Commission sole authority to
review and approve large mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures. Commission
Regulation 4064/89, 1990 O.J. (L257) 13. See also Joseph P. Griffin, Mergers, Joint
Ventures and Takeovers, in EUROPEAN UNION LAW AFrER MAASTRICHT, 425, 425 (Ralph
H. Folsom et al. eds., 1996). The Commission has authority under this regulation to
review business combinations, including those involving U.S. and other foreign
companies, when the following financial thresholds are met: 1) the transaction involves a
combined worldwide annual turnover of at least $5.6 billion; and 2) two or more of the
parties involved in the transaction each have sales of at least $280 million in the EU;
unless 3) each of the parties to the transaction generates more than two-thirds of its EU
sales within the same Member state. Commission Regulation 4064/89, supra, art. 1(2).
See also Griffin, supra, at 425-26; West, supra note 4, at Bi. As a result, the
Commission is required to review whether the merger of foreign firms would threaten
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sentiment was perhaps best summarized by Senator Slade Gorton, R-
Washington, when he said: "I am outraged the Europeans are asserting
antitrust authority in an extraterritorial manner where there is no
relevance, other than the fact that we sell airplanes in their market." 9
Although the EU could not have actually blocked the merger, it did have
the authority to impose multi-billion dollar fines based on ten percent of
Boeing's world income, if it had found that the merger would adversely
affect free trade in Europe.'0 The EU could have also imposed other
sanctions and conditions which would have made it very difficult for
Boeing to sell its aircraft in the EU countries."
Just a year before, in 1996, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
required two Swiss pharmaceutical companies that had merged, Ciba-
Giegy Ltd. and Sandoz Ltd., to sell off key units of their business and to
license a patent to a competitor as a condition for approval of their
merger. 2 The FTC reached its decision on the grounds that the merger
in Switzerland could "quash" domestic competition and thus cause harm
to consumers in the United States, despite the fact that European
competition within the EU, even if neither company had any facilities within the EU, as
long as their worldwide and EU sales met the threshold requirements. See Griffin,
supra, at 426.
9. West, EU Panel, supra note 2, at Cl. Senator Gorton represents the state of
Washington, where Boeing's headquarters and main manufacturing facilities are located.
See Dahlburg, Europe Panel Rejects, supra note 2, at Al.
10. See Boeing Merger Sparks Meetings Between U.S., EU, L.A. TIMES, July 14,
1997, at D2. Under the Merger Regulation, the Commission's powers of investigation
include the authority to impose financial sanctions of fines up to ten percent of
worldwide turnover. Commission Regulation 4064/89, supra note 8, art. 14. The
consolidated annual turnover of the newly merged Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
companies is approximately $50 billion and so, a ten percent fine would equal about $5
billion. See Mark Rice-Oxley, EU Threat to Boeing: Law and Politics, NAT'L L.J., June
9, 1997, atB1.
11. See Christopher Carey, European Aide Blasts Mac, Boeing Merger, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, May 13, 1997, at 06C; Kaplan & Woellert, supra note 8, at B6. The
European Union currently has fifteen member nations, including all the major economic
powers and markets of Western Europe. Such members include: Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain. See Urwin, supra note 1, at 14. As a result, the EU is
a large and lucrative market, with an aggregate population and gross product exceeding
that of the United States and Canada combined. See 2 RALPH H. FOLsOM & MICHAEL
W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BuSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 27.8 (1995). If Boeing was
fined ten percent of its consolidated annual turnover, this expense would most likely be
transferred and incurred by European companies doing business with Boeing. In
addition, European officials could seize Boeing's property assets within the EU if
Boeing failed to pay the fine. See Woellert & Kaplan, supra note 8, at B6. Under the
Merger Regulation, the Commission also has the power to impose divestiture orders.
Commission Regulation 4064/89, supra note 8, art. 8(4).
12. See Woellert & Kaplan, supra note 8, at B6. Specifically, the FTC forced the
companies to sell a pet care unit, which was bought by a California company, Central
Garden and Pet Co. The FTC also ordered the companies to divest their corn-herbicide
business, which was bought by BASF, a German company. The companies' gene-
therapy patent was licensed to a French competitor, Rhone-Poulenc Rorer SA. See id.
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officials had little concern over the deal. 3 Similarly, the EU, in
approving the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merger, also imposed
several conditions that Boeing had to comply with, including: the
licensing out of patents to other aircraft manufacturers (including
Airbus) which are obtained through McDonnell Douglas' military
contracts; maintaining McDonnell Douglas' commercial aircraft
business as a separate legal entity for ten years; and giving up its
exclusive buying agreements with major U.S. airlines.
14
Due to the increase of "mega-mergers" between corporations trying to
compete in the global economy, cross-border regulation of mergers and
acquisitions by both the United States and the European Union has
become much more common. 5 Until recently, such reviews and
13. Id. See discussion infra Part 1V.B.I.
14. See Merger Control, supra note 7; Kaplan & Woellert, supra note 6, at B6. At
the time of the proposed merger, McDonnell Douglas had a six percent share of the
world market for large aircraft (having a capacity of over 100 seats). The merger would
increase Boeing's share of the market for large aircraft to seventy percent. In addition,
the merger of McDonnell's commercial aircraft business would increase Boeing's
customer base to eighty-four percent from sixty percent at the time of the proposed
merger. See Amelia Torres, EU Details Concerns about Boeing, McDonnell Deal, THE
REUTER EUR. CoMMUNIrrY REP., May 23, 1997, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library,
Ecnws file. At the time of the merger, McDonnell Douglas was the world's second
largest defense manufacturer, and the leading manufacturer of military aircraft. As a
result, Boeing's acquisition of McDonnell's defense business greatly enhances Boeing's
access to government-funded R&D and intellectual property. This increase in know-how
provides substantial advantages to Boeing by increasing the benefits gained from the
transfer of military technology to commercial aircraft. Boeing's dominance would be
considerably strengthened to the detriment of its competitors if Boeing were allowed to
exclusively hold the patent rights to such technology. See The Commission Clears the
Merger Between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Under Conditions and Obligations,
RAPID, July 30, 1997, Press Release, IP: 97/729, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library,
Ecnws file. The effect of Boeing's concession on the twenty-year exclusive contracts it
had with Delta, American, and Continental Airlines is unclear at this time. The three
airlines had placed orders for 240 new aircraft under the contracts, and Boeing Chairman
Phil Condit has maintained that these customers were unlikely to reduce their orders as a
result. The European Commission viewed the concession as an important one, and
Airbus believed that the removal of the exclusivity clauses would at least provide "an
opportunity to make sales pitches to top airline executives," and thus weaken the
competitive advantage which Boeing had under the long-term contracts. Although
Condit stated that the concession would have little or "zero" impact on Boeing's bottom
line, he did admit that Boeing had been reluctant to give up the exclusivity clauses right
up to the "eleventh hour" before the European Commission's final decision on the
merger. Merger Control, supra note 7. See also Adam Bryant, Concession with Little
Immediate Effect, N.Y. TIMEs, July 24, 1997, at D5.
15. See Woellert & Kaplan, supra note 8, at B6. According to William Baer,
director of the FTC Bureau of Competition, cross-border regulation has dramatically
increased over the past five years to the point where "[t]wenty-five to 30 percent of what
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regulatory acts by foreign regulators only rarely caused trade disputes or
tensions in diplomatic relations.' 6 In order to maintain cooperation and
prevent serious disputes over regulation of each other's domestic
corporations, the United States and the European Union entered into an
agreement on the application of antitrust laws in 1991.17
This U.S./EC Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation and Coordination 8
is based on the concepts of voluntary cooperation and "positive
comity."' 9 Under Articles VI and VII, the parties agree to recognize the
interests of each side and to provide for regulators on both sides to
coordinate and regularly consult with each other on anti-trust matters.Y
Under the concept of "positive comity" incorporated in Article V of this
Agreement, U.S. and EU regulators may request the other side to initiate
appropriate enforcement activities, if the requesting party believes that
its important interests are being adversely affected by anticompetitive
practices in the other party's territory.
2'
we do involves foreign firms, mergers and non-mergers." Id. During the period between
1991 and 1996, the European Commission reviewed at least twenty-four transactions in
which both parties were foreign firms and had headquarters outside of the EU. See
Griffin, supra note 8, at 449 & n.88.
16. See Woellert & Kaplan, supra note 8, at B6. Examples of mergers which have
faced little opposition from either U.S. or EU antitrust authorities include: Gillette's $7.1
billion purchase of Duracell International Inc. in December, 1996, and the former $20.8
billion merger of British Telecom and MCI Telecommunications in 1994. See id. The
$9.7 billion purchase of American Cyanamid Co. by American Home Products Corp.
was also cleared in 1994. See Doug Abrahms, EU Plans Probe of U.S. Plane Merger,
WASH. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1997, at B7.
17. U.S., EC Commission Forge Antitrust Cooperation Accord, 61 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 375 (Sept. 26, 1991). In March, 1990, Sir Leon Brittan, Vice
President of the European Commission and also responsible for EC competition policy,
made a remark after a speech in New York that, since both the EC and the U.S. have
"forward doctrines ofjurisdiction when it comes to antitrust matters," he believed that an
accord could prevent potential disputes and conflicts. Id. The fact that this accord was
finalized and signed by the U.S. and the EC within eighteen months of Brittan's remark
indicated both sides' desire to respond to their awareness of the increasing globalization
of markets with a cooperative antitrust agreement which would establish "boundaries on
notification, information exchange, consultation, and confidentiality." Id.
18. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and The
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their
Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1487, 1491 (1991) [hereinafter U.S./EC
Agreement].
19. As discussed in Part IV.B below, an inherent weakness of this agreement is
that cooperation and positive comity are not required. Both parties have full discretion
in deciding whether or not to take any enforcement action, either under positive comity
when the party has been requested to do so, or under the cooperation and comity
provisions of Article VI. See U.S./EC Agreement, supra note 18, arts. V 4 & VI, at
1498-1500. See also hifra Part IV.B and accompanying notes.
20. U.S./EC Agreement, supra note 18, arts. VI, VII 1-2, at 1498-1501. See
also U.S., EC Commission, supra note 17, at 377.
21. U.S./EC Agreement, supra note 18, art. V 1-2, at 1497-98. See also U.S.,
EC Commission, supra note 17, at 376-77. This agreement introduced the concept of
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However, the contentious nature of the approval process for both the
BoeingfMcDonnell Douglas and the Ciba-Giegy/Sandoz mergers,22 seem
to indicate that the concepts of cooperation and positive- comity under
the U.S./EC Agreement are no longer being practiced. Although the
parties agreed to consider each side's important interests in determining
whether or not to initiate an investigation, and could also ask the other
party to initiate appropriate enforcement, there was little cooperation or
recognition of each side's interests between the U.S. and EU in both of
these mergers.' The European Commission virtually ignored the
findings of the FTC in the Boeing merger, while the FTC made a
contrary ruling to the European regulators in the Ciba-Giegy merger.2
In addition, a Supreme Court decision subsequent to the U.S./EC
Agreement, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,2 established an
alternative "true conflicts" approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction of
antitrust laws.26 In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that U.S. courts
should not incorporate the principle of comity in considering the
interests of a foreign sovereignty, unless there is a true conflict between
the laws of the two countries.' After this decision, in 1995, the
Department of Justice issued new guidelines for international antitrust
enforcement.' With respect to comity, the guidelines specifically refer
"positive comity," which "permits one authority to request the other authority to initiate
appropriate enforcement activities." Id. See also discussion infra Part IV.A.
22. See supra pp. 1163-66.
23. See id. See also supra notes 20 & 21.
24. See supra pp. 1163-66.
25. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
26. Id. at 798-99. Justice Souter cites Comment e of the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law in determining why a "true conflict" between U.S. and British
law did not exist. Id. Comment e defines a conflict between the regulations of two
states as:
[W]hen one state requires what another prohibits, or where compliance with
the regulations of two states exercising jurisdiction consistently with this
section [§ 403 - Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe] is otherwise
impossible. [True conflict] does not [exist] where a person subject to
regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both; for example, where
one state requires keeping accounts on a cash basis, the other on an accrual
basis. [True conflict] does not [exist] merely because one state has a strong
policy to permit or encourage an activity which another state prohibits, or one
state exempts from regulation an activity which another regulates.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. e
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
27. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99. See also discussion infra Part I1I.B.3.
28. See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, April 5, 1995, 68 Antitrust &
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to the "true conflict" analysis of Hartford Fire, and state that
international comity analysis is a factor only when there is a true conflict
between the laws of the two states.29
This Comment will analyze what status and role the principle of
comity will have in resolving future conflicts of antitrust laws, in view
of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, as well as the Hartford Fire
decision and the 1995 Department of Justice guidelines. Specifically,
the following issues will be addressed: 1) What role, if any, did the
principle of comity have in the final EU approval of the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, and what is the role of comity in
resolving extraterritorial antitrust disputes between the U.S. and the EU
after Boeing? 2) During the height of the dispute, acting assistant
attorney general for antitrust, Joe Klein, flew to Brussels and told the
Europeans that vital economic and military interests of the U.S. were at
stake, and that the Clinton administration would not tolerate any
interference with such a key industry." Given the "realpolitik" concept
that every nation will protect its own economic interests as evidenced by
the Boeing merger dispute,3 can the current U.S./EC agreement based
on the concept of "positive comity" continue to be a viable framework
for resolving antitrust jurisdiction disputes? 3) Can comity be
successfully utilized to resolve future conflicts of antitrust laws, or is
there a need for an international agreement providing uniform standards
for antitrust jurisdiction?
Part II of this Comment summarizes the legal basis for extraterritorial
application of antitrust law by both the United States and the European
Union. Part III outlines the principle of comity and the development in
the United States of the comity principle's role in resolving conflicts of
antitrust law. Part IV critiques the U.S./EC Antitrust Cooperation
Agreement and its effectiveness during the Boeing merger dispute. Part
V analyzes the current status and role of comity after the Boeing merger
dispute. Part VI provides an overview and comparison of other bilateral
agreements and models for resolution of conflicts in antitrust laws. Part
VII concludes that, with the increasing number of countries expanding
their antitrust/competition laws and the growth in "mega-mergers"
which have widespread impact in a global economy, there is a need for
an international agreement within a forum such as the World Trade
Organization to provide uniform rules for antitrust enforcement.
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Special Supplement (Apr. 6, 1995), reprinted in MATrHEV
BENDER, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION PRIMARY SOURCE PAMPHLET, 137
(2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter 1995 DOJ Guidelines).
29. Id. ch. 3.2, at 157.
30. See Pearlstein & Swardson, supra note 5, at Cl.
31. See supra pp. 1163-65.
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II. LEGAL BASIS FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST JURISDICTION
A. United States: The Sherman Act 2
The Sherman Act, which governs U.S. antitrust law, includes two
basic prohibitions. In Section 1, every "contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade" is illegal.33
Section 2 makes it illegal for an individual to "monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize" any part of commerce or trade?4 Both Sections 1 and 2
contain specific language that these prohibitions apply to trade or
commerce "with foreign nations."35 In addition, Section 6a provides for
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act on foreign enterprises
conducting restraints on trade that have a "direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect" on the domestic U.S. market.36
The right to apply the Sherman Act prohibitions to foreign commerce
that is either intended to or does affect the U.S. market was judicially
upheld in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.3 In this case, the
Sherman Act antitrust laws were applied to a foreign cartel that acted
almost completely outside of the U.S. by making its agreements in
Switzerland, but still caused restraint on U.S. imports by agreeing to
32. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
33. Id. § 1. Specifically, Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
34. Id. § 2. Specifically, Section 2 provides: 'Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... Id.
35. Id. §§ 1-2.
36. Id. § 6a. Section 6a provides:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than import import trade or import commerce) with foreign
nations unless - (1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect - (A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce
with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign
nations; or 03) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and such
effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this title,
other than this section.
Id.
37. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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limit the amount of aluminum to be sold in the U.S.38 Judge Learned
Hand developed the "effects test," for governing the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws. Under this test, any agreement made
by foreign corporations is illegal if it was either intended to or does
affect commerce within the U.S. in an unlawful manner under the
Sherman Act.39 Judge Hand based this "effects test" on the principle that
if a foreign corporation's conduct outside the state's borders has
consequences within that state's borders, then that state may impose
liabilities even upon those corporations "not within its allegiance. ''4"
B. European Union: Articles 85 and 86 in the Treaty of Rome
European Union competition law arises directly from Articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty of Rome of 1957.4' Article 85 prohibits agreements and
concerted practices in restraint of trade.42 Article 86 prohibits the
"abuses of [a] dominant position," and also regulates single and multiple
party activities.43
38. See id. at 443-45.
39. Id. at 444-45.
40. Id. at 445.
41. See Stephen Johnson, EU Competition Law, in EUROPEAN UNION LAW AFrER
MAASTRICHT, 341 (Ralph H. Folsom et al. eds., 1996). The signatory nations of the
Treaty of Rome were: France, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and
Luxembourg. See Urwin, supra note 1, at 13. The Treaty of Rome was incorporated
into the Treaty on European Union which created the current European Union. See
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, tit. II, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter Treaty on
European Union]. See also RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION BusINESS LAW
SOURCEBOOK 1, (1995). The signatory nations were: Belgium, Denmark, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See Treaty on European Union, supra, 31
I.L.M., at 247.
42. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 342-43. Article 85(1)-(2) states:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those
which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling price or any other
trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical
development, or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of
contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, art. 85(1)-(2), reprinted in FOLSOM, supra note 41, at
1, 36-37 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
43. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 343-44. Article 86 provides in full:
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There are three distinctive features of EU competition law: 1) EU
competition law aims to ensure that the Common Market works
effectively; 2) The Competition Commission can exempt normally
prohibited agreements which restrict competition from the Article 85
prohibitions, if there are certain benefits for efficiency and consumers;
and 3) EU industrial policy. Community integration and fairness to
individual competitors or consumers are an important part of the EU
analysis for competition jurisprudence. 44
The key language in Article 85 is that the agreements, undertakings,
and concerted practices that are prohibited are those that "may affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market. "' 45 Article 86 has similar language, by prohibiting any
abuses of a dominant position "within the common market or... in so
far as it may affect trade between Member States."' Although the
language of both Articles 85 and 86 do not specifically include
commerce with "foreign nations" as the Sherman Act does, both articles
certainly leave open the possibility for interpretation of extraterritorial
application, by prohibiting any agreement or act which has an "effect"
on the "Member States."
Indeed, the Commission and European Court of Justice have taken
such a broad view of EU competition law and have found jurisdiction for
actions by non-European companies directed at the EU Common
Market.47  For example, the European Court of Justice extended
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 42, art. 86, at 37-38.
44. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 341-42.
45. Treaty of Rome, supra note 42, art. 85(1), at 36-37. See also Johnson, supra
note 41, at 342-43.
46. Treaty of Rome, supra note 42, art. 86, at 37-38. See also Johnson, supra note
41, at 343-44.
47. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 34748.
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extraterritorial application of Article 86 to Commercial Solvents, a
Maryland company that refused to sell its product to a competitor of its
affiliate in the EU.' The Court stated that conduct outside of the EU
which merely had repercussions on the Common Market competitive
structures fell within the parameters of Article 86, and ordered
Commercial Solvents, through its Italian affiliate, to supply the
competitor at a reasonable price.49
The Court of Justice also expanded the extraterritorial application of
Article 85 in a case where the Court fined woodpulp producers from the
United States, Canada, Sweden, and Finland for price-fixing activities
which affected EU trade and competition." This case is significant
because EU competition laws were applied extraterritorially, even
though all the firms involved were primarily exporters to the Common
Market, and did not have substantial operations within the EU.5' In
another case, the Court applied Articles 85 and 86 extraterritorially to
airfares in and out of the community. 2 Based on these decisions, it
48. See Case 6, 7/73, Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R.
223, 13 C.M.L.R. 309 (1974).
49. See id. The Court found that Commercial Solvents exercised enough control
over its Italian subsidiary that the two companies should be treated as a "single
undertaking" under Article 86. Id. at 253-54, 13 C.M.L.R. at 343. The Court also found
that Commercial Solvents held a dominant position, i.e. a world monopoly on certain
chemicals used to manufacture ethambutol, and abused that dominant position by
refusing to supply those raw materials to a major manufacturer of ethambutol in the EC.
See id. at 250-51, 13 C.M.L.R. at 340-41. The Court allowed the Commission to force
Commercial Solvents to supply to the EC manufacturer (Zoja), because otherwise
Commercial Solvents would have been able control the cost price of Zoja to the extent
that Zoja's production of ethambutol would likely have become unmarketable. See id. at
256, 13 C.M.L.R. at 345. The Court found this "effect" to fall within the language of
Article 86, which, again, prevents the abuse of a dominant position that "may affect trade
between Member States." Id. at 252-53, 13 C.M.L.R. at 340-42.
50. See Case 89, et al./85, A. Ahistrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R.
5193, [198814 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988) [hereinafter Wood Pulp Case]. In the judgment of
the Court, the combined cases (case 89, et. al./85) were referred to as "wood pulp". 1988
E.C.R. at 5233.
51. 1988 E.C.R. at 5242-43, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 940-41. The Court in its
judgment noted that although the main sources of wood pulp in the global market were
countries outside the EU, if these producers sold directly to EU purchasers and
"engage[d] in price competition in order to win orders" from EU customers, then that
qualified as competition within the EU. Id. Having determined that the non-European
producers qualified under competition rules in the EU, the Court concluded that Article
85 applied because these producers both "concert[ed]" and put into effect that
concentration by selling at coordinated prices which had the "object and effect' of
restricting competition within the EU under the meaning of Article 85. Id. at 5243,
[1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 941.
52. Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekampfung unlauteren
Wettbewerbs eV, 1989 E.C.R. 1-838, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 102 (1989). In this case, the
Court applied both Articles 85 and 86 to a dominant firm which had succeeded in having
tariffs applied by other firms. Id. at 1-844-51, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 131-36 (1989).
Although Article 85 is usually applied to concerted action while Article 86 is applied to
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appears that EU competition laws will be used to find jurisdiction over
foreign companies which have activities or conduct business directed at
the EU market. 3
IT. THE PRINCIPLE OF CoMITY's ROLE IN RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF
ANTITRUST LAWS
A. The Principle of Comity in Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations
Law of the United States
The concept of comity is defined in the Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law as follows:
Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to the
international duty and convenience and to the rights-of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
When conflicts arise between two or more nations claiming
jurisdiction over a matter (as is increasingly the case in international
antitrust disputes), international law provides this doctrine of comity for
resolving such conflicts, because there is no rule of principle under
international law for resolving issues related to concurrent jurisdiction.55
unilateral action by a dominant firm, the Court found that both can apply in a situation
such as this case, where an agreement is entered into and that agreement masks the
dominant firm's exercise of its market power. See 2 Eur. Union L. Rep. (CCH) 2001
& n.21.
53. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 348.
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, INTERNATIONAL LAW DEFINED § 101
cmt. e, (1987) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)).
55. See Robert C. Reuland, Hartford Fire Insurance Co., Comity, and the
Extraterritorial Reach of United States Antitrust Laws, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 159, 192
(1994). Reuland notes that although comity can be viewed as the "international
equivalent of the Golden Rule" in requiring states to "do unto others as they would have
done unto them," comity is criticized for being vague and "airy." Id. For other criticism
of the comity doctrine, see Harold G. Maler, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a
Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L., 280 (1982). Maier observes that:
In Anglo-American law the extension of comity to another nation is viewed as
a unilateral decision of the forum, not as an act required by a rule of the public
international system. This emphasis on the voluntary nature of the doctrine
has led to its use to describe an amorphous never-never land whose borders are
marked by fuzzy lines of politics, courtesy, and good faith. Like the concept
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The objective of a comity analysis is to determine which of the nations
that have a basis for jurisdiction has the superior or most "reasonable"
claim.56 Comity, therefore, does not determine whether a nation has
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Rather, once jurisdiction exists among two
or more nations, comity is utilized to determine whether a nation should
exercise its jurisdiction.57 However, the doctrine of comity can be
considered limited in its effectiveness because, as stated above in the
Restatement (Third) definition of comity, it is not a legal obligation and
therefore is not legally binding.58
In determining whether a nation can assert its existing jurisdiction
extraterritorially, 5 the Restatement (Third) limits the exercise of such
jurisdiction if it is unreasonable. 6°  Under this "principle of
reasonableness," several factors are delineated to determine whether
extraterritorial jurisdiction is reasonable or not.61  If it is not
of public policy in the conflict of laws, the label "comity" in modem times has
sometimes come to serve as a substitute for analysis.
Id. at 281.
56. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 403 cmts. d, e.
57. See Reuland, supra note 55, at 194.
58. See supra note 54. See also Reuland, supra note 55, at 192-94 ("A state's
failure to account for comity does not breach international law and subjects a state to no
penalty greater than another state's refusal to reciprocate."). Id. at 194; Maier, supra
note 55, at 281. Maier states that "The doctrine of comity is not a rule of public
international law .... ." Id.
59. Section 402 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) establishes the general basis for
jurisdiction, including extraterritorial jurisdiction:
Subject to Section 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law to: a) conduct
that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; b) the status
of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; [and] c) conduct
outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 402(1)(a)-(c).
60. See id. § 403(1). Section 403(1) states in full: "Even when one of the bases for
jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law
with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." Id.
61. Id. § 403(2). The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) has eight considerations relevant to
determining whether a particular exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. They are:
a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent
to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is
designed to protect;
c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which the other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
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unreasonable for two or more nations to exercise jurisdiction, then
according to the Restatement (Third), each nation is obligated to
evaluate both its own and the other state's interest in exercising
jurisdiction under the factors listed in section 403(2),62 and a nation
"should defer" to the other nation if that nation's interest is clearly
greater.
63
It is interesting to note how the Restatement (Third) both differentiates
and integrates the concepts of comity and the principle of
reasonableness. Comment (a) of section 403 specifically states that the
"principle of reasonableness" is a rule of international law,64 whereas
"comity" is specifically distinguished from international law in the
Restatement (Third)'s definition of international law.65 Comment (a)
notes that although some courts in the United States have applied the
principle of reasonableness as "a requirement of comity," this principle
is independent of comity, and applies regardless of the relationship
between the urisdiction-exercising nation and the nation whose interests
are affected.
The concept of comity is also integrated in the reasonableness
principle, both in considering the factors for determining reasonableness
in section 403(2),67 and when there are conflicting reasonable exercises
of jurisdiction between two countries.6' However, according to the
language of section 403(3) and subsequent explanation in comment (e),
e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating activity;
and
h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 403(3).
64. Id. cmt. a.
65. Id. § 101 cmt. e.
66. Id. § 403 cmt. a.
67. Id. Comment (a) refers to the "reciprocity" element of comity and states that
some elements of reciprocity may be relevant in considering the Section 403(2) factors.
In addition, Reporter Note 6 states that for subsections (2)(g) and (h) (see supra note 61),
as well as for Section 403(3), "it may be necessary to identify and weigh the respective
interests of the concerned states in regulating (or refraining from regulating) a given
activity or transaction."
Id. § 403(3) rep. note 6 (1986).
68. See id. § 403(3) & cmt. e.
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although each nation is required to evaluate both its interests and the
interests of the other nation, the Restatement (Third) appears to give a
nation discretion in deferring to the nation with the greater interest, by
stating that a nation "should" defer. 9 Therefore, it appears that the role
of comity for the principle of reasonableness rule is to provide a means
to determine whether already-existing jurisdiction which could be
reasonably exercised should be asserted, whereas the principle of
reasonableness determines whether extraterritorial jurisdiction exists,
independent of any comity analysis.
With regards to extraterritorial jurisdiction of anti-competitive
activities, section 415 provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction over any
agreement or conduct carried on outside of the U.S. if the principal
purpose is to interfere with the commerce of the U.S. and has some
effect on commerce," or if ii has a substantial effect on U.S. commerce.7
Any exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under this section however,
is subject to the general principles of sections 402 and 403, and is only
allowed if the exercise of such jurisdiction is reasonable. 2 Therefore,
the concept of comity has an inherent role in determining the exercising
of extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. anti-competitive laws, but only
within its application under the principle of the reasonableness rule.
69. Id. Section 403(3) states in full:
When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are
in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other
state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors,
Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is
clearly greater.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Reuland, supra note 55, at 202-03.
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 415(2). Section 415(2) provides in
full:
Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made outside of the
United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade that is
carried out predominantly outside of the United States, are subject to the
jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States, if a principal purpose of the
conduct or agreement is to interfere with the commerce of the United States,
and the agreement or conduct has some effect on that commerce.
Id.
71. See id. § 415(3). Section 415(3) provides in full: "Other agreements or
conduct in restraint of the United States trade are subject to the jurisdiction to prescribe
of the United States if such agreements or conduct have substantial effect on the
commerce of the United States and the exercise of jurisdiction is not unreasonable." Id.
72. See id. cmt. a.
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B. Development of the Application of Comity in the Exercising of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust Laws
1. Jurisdictional Rule of Reasoning: The Timberlane Lumber Case
The seminal case for establishing the concept of comity in the
extraterritorial jurisdiction analysis is Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America.73  Prior to this case, the prevailing U.S. approach for
establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction of its antitrust law was the
"effects test," established in 1945 by Judge Learned Hand in U.S. v.
Aluminum Co. of America [hereinafter Alcoa].74 This case held that if an
agreement made outside of the United States was intended to affect U.S.
imports or exports and did have an actual effect, then the Sherman Act
would apply.
In Timberlane, the lumber company alleged that Bank of America and
other U.S. and Honduran companies conspired to prevent Timberlane,
through its Honduras subsidiaries, from milling lumber in Honduras and
exporting it to the United States. The intended effect was to maintain
control of the Honduran lumber export business among a few selected
individual companies financed and controlled by the Bank. The district
court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and because there was
no substantial effect on U.S. foreign commerce, which was deemed as a
prerequisite for jurisdiction.6
The Ninth Circuit held that the "effects test" established in Alcoa was
"incomplete" to determine whether to exercise jurisdiction, because it
failed "to consider other nations' interests," and because it did not "take
into account the full nature of the relationship between the actors and
this country."77  The court specifically stated that "as a matter of
international comity and fairness," the effect on U.S. commerce is not a
sufficient basis on its own "on which to determine whether American
authority should be asserted."'
73. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
74. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
75. Id. at 444-45. Judge Hand declared that it was "settled law... that any state
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside
its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these
liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize." Id. at 443.
76. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 601.
77. Id. at 611-12 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 613.
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As a result, the court adopted the "jurisdictional rule of reason" test,
which balances foreign and domestic interests as a preferred approach to
determine extraterritorial jurisdiction of antitrust laws, and established a
three-part test of jurisdiction. 9  The requirements for establishing
jurisdiction included comity considerations: 1) there had to be some
effect on the foreign commerce of the United States; 2) the effect had to
be substantial enough to be "cognizable" as a violation of the Sherman
Act; and 3) as a matter of international comity and fairness, the interests
of the United States had to be strong enough, in balancing the interests
of the other nations, to justify the exercising of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The court provided seven factors for consideration when
applying its three-part test."°
The significance of the Timberlane case, therefore, was that the notion
of comity was incorporated into the analysis for determining
extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust laws. The Timberlane
approach and evaluating factors were adopted by the Restatement
(Third).8'
2. Rejection of Jurisdictional Rule of Reasoning
Although the Timberlane approach was adopted by some circuits,"
other circuits rejected the balancing approach. In Laker Airways, Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,83 the D.C. Circuit rejected the balancing
approach because it believed that courts were not capable of balancing
the vital national interests of the United States and other nations to
determine which should predominate." The 7th Circuit in In re
Uranium Antitrust Litigation" held that comity considerations are
discretionary, and should only be considered for the purposes of
deciding whether jurisdiction that had already been determined to exist
should be asserted.86 With regard to the Timberlane approach, the court
79. Id. at 613-15.
80. See id. The seven factors include: 1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or
policy; 2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties; 3) the extent to which enforcement
by either state can be expected to achieve compliance; 4) the relative significance of
effects on the United States as compared to the impact elsewhere; 5) the degree of intent
to affect commerce in the U.S.; 6) the foreseeability of the effect; and 7) the relative
importance of the violation within the U.S. compared to the importance of the violation
elsewhere. Id. at 614 (footnotes omitted).
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 403(2).
82. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98
(3d Cir. 1979); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-71 (10th Cir.
1981).
83. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
84. Id. at 950-52.
85. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
86. Id. at 1255.
1180
[VOL. 35: 1163, 1998] Antitrust Enforcement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
concluded that Timberlane "reaffirms" the Alcoa standard of
determining when jurisdiction is present.'
3. "True Conflict" Approach: The Hartford Fire Case
The biggest setback for the role of comity considerations in resolving
conflicts in antitrust laws appears to have occurred with the majority
opinion of the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California.88
This case stemmed from the consolidated complaints of nineteen states
and several private plaintiffs that alleged that the defendants, which
included domestic and London-based companies in the insurance
industry, violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to force certain
primary insurers to change and restrict the terms of their standard
commercial general liability insurance coverage and policies to conform
with the policies that the defendants wanted to sell.89 The states alleged
that this agreement which modified the policy forms was a boycott."
With regard to the London-based defendants, the district court
dismissed the claims by applying the Timberlane analysis and invoking
international comity as a basis for declining to exercise jurisdiction."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's holding,
including the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction.? In addressing the
claims against the London-based defendants, the Ninth Circuit also
applied the Timberlane analysis, but concluded that comity did not bar
the exercising of Sherman Act jurisdiction, because only one factor
pointed towards the declining of jurisdiction - the conflict with long-
established British policy towards the trade 
of underwriting insurance.
93
Justice Souter, writing the opinion for the majority of the U.S.
Supreme Court, established at the outset of the holding that the Sherman
Act did apply to foreign conduct that was unlawful under the Act, and
that was meant to have and did have a substantial effect in the United
States. 4 The Court found that there "undoubtedly" was jurisdiction over
87. Id. at 1255 & nn.25 & 28.
88. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
89. See id. at 770-71.
90. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.Supp. 464, 468 (N.D. Cal.
1989), rev'd, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991).
91. See id. at 486-87.
92. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 938 F.2d 919, 922, 932-34 (9th Cir.
1991).
93. See id. at 932-34.
94. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 (citations omitted).
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the conduct of the London-based defendants under the Sherman Act.95
Justice Souter then rejected the British defendants' argument that
consideration of circumstances under international comity would
preclude the exercise of Sherman Act jurisdiction.
Justice Souter rejected the argument that a conflict existed between
domestic and foreign law, by establishing a narrow definition of "true
conflict" as the inability to comply with both domestic and foreign law.96
Justice Souter then framed the issue as to whether "there is in fact true
conflict between domestic and foreign law," and held that international
comity did not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction in this case because
British law did not require the defendants to act in a way which was
contrary to United States law. Therefore, the defendants could have
complied with U.S. law without violating British law; and according to
Justice Souter, no true conflict exists between domestic and foreign law
when "a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the
laws of both."97
The Supreme Court declined to address the issue of whether a court
should ever decline the exercise of Sherman Act jurisdiction on the
grounds of international comity.98 In addition, although the Court cited
the Timberlane analysis, it did not address the validity of the comity
95. Id. at 795-96. The conduct of the defendant British insurance companies
allegedly violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The British reinsurers allegedly
conspired to coerce U.S. primary insurers to offer CGL coverage on a claims-made basis,
which would have made "occurrence CGL coverage.., unavailable in the State of
California for many risks." Id. at 795 (citations omitted). The defendants also allegedly
conspired to limit coverage of pollution risks in North America which would have
resulted in making pollution liability coverage unavailable for most casualty insurance
purchasers in California. In addition, the defendants allegedly conspired along with
domestic retrocessional insurers to eliminate seepage, pollution and property
contamination risk coverage in California. See id. (citations omitted). In addressing the
issue of whether the Sherman Act applied to the conduct of the British defendants,
Justice Souter stated: "Such is the conduct alleged here: that the London reinsurers
engaged in unlawful conspiracies to affect the market for insurance in the United States
and that their conduct in fact produced substantial effect." Id. at 796 (citations omitted).
The London reinsurers conceded in their oral argument that a U.S. court had jurisdiction
of the Sherman Act claims and instead argued that this extraterritorial jurisdiction should
be "restrained" under the principle of comity. Id. at 795.
96. Id. at 797-99.
97. Id. The London reinsurers and British government argued that application of
the Sherman Act would conflict with British law because the defendant's alleged
conduct was lawful under a regulatory regime over the London reinsurance market
established by the British Parliament. See id. at 798. In citing RESTATEMENT (THiRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 415 Comment j, Justice Souter found that there was no
conflict between U.S. and British law because "'[Tihe fact that conduct is lawful in the
state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar application of the United States
antitrust laws,' even where the foreign state has a strong policy to permit or encourage
such conduct." Id, at 799.
93. Id. at 799.
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analysis of the Timberlane three-part test for jurisdiction." As a result of
the Court not addressing these issues, it remains uncertain whether lower
courts will continue to use the Timberlane approach or incorporate the
approach of Hartford Fire, which applies a comity analysis only if a true
conflict exists."0
The resulting effect on the role of comity in resolving conflicts of
extraterritorial jurisdiction after the Hartford Fire case remains unclear,
and Justice Souter's opinion is open to a variety of interpretations. 0'
Several commentators believe that the Hartford Fire decision has "swept
away" the concept of comity, the rule of reasonableness, and section 403
of the Restatement (Third).°2 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, a reporter for the
Restatement (Third), and a member of the legal team that prepared the
brief in chief on behalf of the foreign defendants to the Supreme Court
in the Hartford Fire case, commented that the U.S. Supreme Court
"takes the effects doctrine for granted" and, at the very least, the
Timberlane approach of the rule of reason "seem[s] to have lost some of
[its] significance."'0 3
99. Id. at 797-98 & 797 n.24.
100. See 1 EARLW. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTrnRUST LAW 32-33 (Supp. 1998).
101. Id. Justice Souter utilized language which was open to different interpretations
when he declared: "We have no need in this litigation to address other considerations
that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of
international comity." Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799.
102. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws:
A Postscript on Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 213, 220-25
(1993) (In Hartford, the Supreme Court "unequivocally affirmed" the effects test, which
brings "the Sherman Act and other laws into sharp and unnecessary conflict with the
legitimate interests of other countries" quoting J. Scalia's dissent in the Hartford Fire
case. As a result, Hartford shows little consideration of or concern for the valid
sovereign interests of another country with concurrent jurisdiction); Scott A. Burr, The
Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to Foreign Conduct: Has Hartford Fire Extinguished
Considerations of Comity?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 221, 252 (1994) (The Hartford
decision "brings to an end the debate concerning the propriety of a Timberlane comity
analysis [jurisdictional rule of reason]. While not explicitly rejecting the Timberlane
approach... the Court's conflict resolution test will result in ... the application of the
forum state's law when the forum has any interest at all in the conduct at issue."); Philip
R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement
Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53, 56-57 (1995) (The majority in Hartford declined to
apply Section 403 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD). "The Court's opinion represents an
important development in the customary international law of prescriptive jurisdiction.
The decision itself... becomes part of U.S. state practice... [and] [t]his resulting
authoritative statement of customary international law reaffirms the traditional,
unqualified 'effects' doctrine and rejects section 403." (emphasis added)).
103. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of
Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT"L
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The results of the Hartford Fire decision may indeed prove Professor
Lowenfeld's observation to be true. Under Hartford Fire, the concept of
comity, which is utilized in the jurisdictional rule of reason for
determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be exercised,
will now only be applied if the court determines that a true conflict
exists. As Justice Souter notes in his opinion, there is no true conflict
between domestic and foreign law when a person subject to regulation
by two states can comply with the laws of both. The 1995 DOJ
Guidelines observe that it has become increasingly true that an actual
conflict between the U.S. and a foreign antitrust law does not exist,
because more countries have adopted antitrust or competition laws that
are compatible with the laws of the United States."° With the growing
convergence of national antitrust laws among nations, true conflicts will
become very rare. Therefore, under the true conflict approach of
Hartford Fire, the jurisdictional rule of reason approach of Timberlane
will rarely be utilized in determining whether extraterritorial antitrust
jurisdiction should be exercised.' 5
Another important result of the Hartford Fire decision in relation to
the role of comity for resolving conflicts in the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of antitrust laws, is that it brings the United States closer to
the approach of the EU: namely, that comity is not used unless there is a
true conflict.' The holding of Hartford Fire is consistent with the
approach of the European Court of Justice utilized in the Wood Pulp
case. ' 7 The European Court of Justice's "implementation approach"
asserts jurisdiction on the basis of objective territoriality. The Court in
Wood Pulp refused to consider comity because it would question the
European Union's jurisdiction to apply its competition rules, an
argument that had already been rejected. The only time that comity
would be considered is if a true conflict existed, which the court did not
L. 42,47-48 (1995).
104. 1995 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 28, ch. 3.2 at 157. See also Alford, supra
note 102, at 229.
105. See Alford, supra note 102, at 229.
106. See id. at 214.
107. See Wood Pulp Case, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901(1988). See
also Alford, supra note 102, at 225-26. Alford argues that Hanford Fire and Wood Pulp
demonstrate a convergence on matters of comity between the U.S. and the EU:
The effects doctrine is continually being narrowed and qualified to require a
showing of stronger jurisdictional nexus through direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effects, while the objective territoriality approach is
being reformulated and expanded to encompass certain activities that would
fall well outside its traditional ambit. The result is a convergence of
application of [E.U.] and U.S. antitrust laws vis-a-vis foreign defendants.
Id.
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find in Wood Pulp.' The significance of the Hartford Fire and Wood
Pulp cases is that the narrow definition of a "true conflict" of laws will
"ensuret] that comity will almost never be a factor in the extraterritorial
application of antitrust laws."'"
4. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
In 1995, the Justice Department and FTC issued guidelines explaining
the agencies' policies on the international enforcement of U.S. antitrust
law."0 With regards to comity, the 1995 DOJ Guidelines are significant
because they specifically cite to the Hartford Fire case and adopt the
108. See Wood Pulp Case, 1988 E.C.R. at 5244, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 942. The
wood pulp producers argued that the extraterritorial application of Article 85 violated
international law because it applied to their conduct outside the European Community.
The Court rejected this argument and stated that even though the producers' conduct was
adopted outside of the Community, there were economic repercussions within the
Community because of the producers' implementation of their agreement and therefore,
"the Community's jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to such conduct is covered
by the territoriality principle as universally recognized in public international law." Id.
at 5243, 1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 941(emphasis added). See also Alford, supra note 102, at
226.
109. Alford, supra note 102, at 227. Alford observes that under both the U.S. and
EU approaches towards determining extraterritorial jurisdiction, a "true conflict" only
exists "when there are mutually exclusive state obligations that make compliance with
both impossible .... []n the vast majority of antitrust cases the conflict is between one
state encouraging or permitting certain behavior and another state prohibiting that same
behavior." Id. at 226-27 (emphasis in original).
110. See 1995 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 28. Under these guidelines, there are
four major principles for the agencies' international antitrust enforcement operations:
[1] "[F]oreign commerce cases can involve almost any provision of the
antitrust laws;"
[2] The enforcement agencies "do not discriminate in the enforcement of the
antitrust laws on the basis of the nationality of the parties";
[3] The agencies do not use their antitrust authority to further non-antitrust
objectives; and
[4] Once jurisdictional requirements, comity and doctrines of foreign
governmental involvement have been considered and satisfied, the substantive
antitrust rules that apply to domestic operations apply with equal force to
international operations.
68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. (BNA) 462 (Apr. 6, 1995). The guidelines discuss relevant
federal antitrust and related statutes. The guidelines also include factors for the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to consider in deciding
whether to exercise jurisdiction over anticompetitive conduct. These factors are
illustrated through hypothetical situations which explain how the agencies would analyze
such situations. See id.
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position that comity analysis applies only when there is a true conflict."'
The guidelines also adopt the affirmation of the effects test in Hartford
Fire for determining Sherman Act jurisdiction in foreign commerce
cases, and they acknowledge that the Hartford Fire holding is consistent
with the EU approach articulated in the Wood Pulp case."' As a result,
the 1995 guidelines utilize the effects test affirmed by Hartford Fire,
rather than the jurisdictional rule of reason.
This is a significant departure from the 1988 guidelines that were
replaced by the 1995 version. In the 1988 Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations,"' the guidelines begin the
chapter on "Factors Affecting the Department's Exercise of Discretion
in Asserting Jurisdiction" by recognizing the considerations of comity in
enforcing antitrust laws." 4 In the 1988 DOJ Guidelines, the Department
of Justice appears to adopt the "jurisdictional rule of reason" in the
language of the guidelines. Specifically, the 1988 Guidelines state that
"in determining whether it would be reasonable to assert jurisdiction or
to seek particular remedies in a given case, the Department considers
whether significant interests of any foreign sovereign would be affected
and asserts jurisdiction only when the Department concludes that it
would be reasonable to do so."'
15
In contrast, the 1995 DOJ Guidelines begin the issue of jurisdiction by
citing Hartford Fire and adopting the effects test for determining
extraterritorial jurisdiction for the Sherman Act."6 The doctrine of
comity is introduced after the chapters on the determination of
extraterritorial jurisdiction."' Although the 1995 DOJ Guidelines state
111. 1995 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 28, ch. 3.2, at 157. Chapter 3.2, in
discussing the consideration of international comity states:
With respect to the factor concerning conflict with foreign law, the Supreme
Court made clear in Hartford Fire that no conflict exists for purposes of
international comity analysis in the courts if the person subject to regulation by
two states can comply with the laws of both. Bearing this in mind, the
Agencies first ask what laws or policies of the arguably interested foreign
jurisdictions are implicated by the conduct in question.
Id.
112. Id. ch. 3.1, at 149 & n.51. The DOJ states that: "the 'implementation' test
adopted in the European Court of Justice usually produces the same outcome as the
'effects' test employed by the United States." Id. at 149 n.51.
113. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations-1988, (Nov. 10,
1988), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,109 at 20,589-20 [hereinafter 1988
DOJ Guidelines]. According to the Department of Justice, these guidelines were
"intended to provide businesses engaged in international operations with practical
guidance concerning the Department's internal antitrust enforcement policies and
procedures." Id. at 20,589-21.
114. Id. at20,612.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. 1995 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 28, ch. 3.1 at 149.
117. See id. at 149-57. Under the chapter for "Threshold International Enforcement
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that comity will be considered in enforcing antitrust laws, it again cites
Hartford Fire and emphasizes that only "true conflicts" require comity
analysis."'
Therefore, comity has less prominence in the 1995 DOJ Guidelines,
where it is considered after jurisdiction has been established, than in the
1988 DOJ Guidelines, where comity is stated as one of the factors in the
Department's exercise of discretion in asserting jurisdiction.
Indeed, as one commentator has observed, the focus of the 1995 DOJ
Guidelines appears to have shifted from resolving conflicts in laws
through comity, to exploring who should enforce antitrust actions."9
IV. THE U.S./EC ANTrrRUST COOPERAnTON AGREEMENT OF 1991
A. Incorporation of Comity Principles
In 1991, the United States and the European Community entered into
an executive agreement on antitrust cooperation and coordination." The
main objective of the agreement is to promote cooperation and
coordination and lessen the possibility of differences between the
parties' competition laws through notification, exchange of information,
consultation, and comity in the application and enforcement of the
parties' respective competition laws. 2' This agreement was also the first
bilateral agreement at the time to introduce the concept of "positive
Issues," jurisdiction is first discussed (in 3.1), followed by comity (in 3.2). It is
interesting to note that the jurisdictional rule of reason language adopted in the 1988
DOS Guidelines (the DOJ "asserts jurisdiction only when the Department concludes that
it would be reasonable to do so") is not included in either the jurisdiction or comity
discussions in the 1995 DOJ Guidelines. Compare 1988 DOJ Guidelines, supra note
113, at 20,612 with 1995 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 28, at 149-57.
118. 1995 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 28, at 157.
119. See Robert D. Shank, The Justice Department's Recent Antitrust Enforcement
Policy: Toward a "Positive Comity" Solution to International Competition Problems?,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 155, 174 (1996). See also 1995 DOJ Guidelines, supra note
28, ch. 3.2 at 157. Ch. 3.2 on comity states: "The Agencies also will consider whether
the objectives sought to be obtained by the assertion of U.S. law would be achieved in a
particular instance by foreign enforcement." Id. at 158. When the Department of Justice
decides to prosecute an antitrust action in lieu of foreign enforcement because the
Department believes the domestic antitrust enforcement interests are strong, the
Department holds that the courts no longer have a role to "second-guess the executive
branch's judgment as to the proper role of comity under these circumstances." Id.
120. See U.S./EC Agreement, supra note 18.
121. Id. at 1491-1501.
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comity. ' ' 2
Under the concept of positive comity set out in Article V of the
U.S./EC Agreement, one of the parties can request the other party's
competition authorities to initiate appropriate enforcement activities, if
the requesting party believes that anticompetitive activities being carried
out in the other party's territory are adversely affecting the requesting
party's "important interests.' ' "n
Article VI provides for the more traditional concept of comity, by
requiring the parties to "take into account the important interests of the
other party," during its investigation and enforcement proceedings.24
What is unique about the concept of positive comity, according to then
Assistant Attorney General James F. Rill, is that either the U.S. or the
EC could ask the other party's authorities to proceed under foreign law
against any potential or actual anticompetitive activity which could harm
the requesting party's interests.'2 This concept of comity goes beyond
the traditional notion of comity, where parties agreed to consider the
other's interests in determining whether to take any enforcement
action."
B. Effectiveness of U.S./EC Agreement in Resolving Conflicts
Both U.S. and EC officials hailed the intention of the new
coordination and positive comity provisions as a way to reach an
agreement about which jurisdiction should take the lead in investigating
a particular matter. With regard to mergers, the notification provisions
were intended to enable the other party's views to be taken into
consideration.'27 However, it is important to note that the U.S./EC
122. See European Lawyers Predict Negative Impact on Business Sector from New
U.S./ECAccord, 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 376,376 (Sept. 26, 1991).
123. U.S./EC Agreement, supra note 18, art. V 2, at 1498.
124. Id. art. VI, at 1498.
125. See U.S., EC Comnmission Forge Antitrust Cooperation Accord, 61 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 375, 375 (Sept. 26, 1991).
126. See William K. Walker, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws:
The Effect of the European Community-United States Antitrust Agreement, 33 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 583, 590 (1992). Walker provides the following example of how positive
comity would "ideally" work: "If the United States was concerned that a proposed
merger of two European companies would have an adverse impact on American trade in
Europe... it could request that the European Community, under its own competition
laws, prevent or rescind the merger." 1d. However, as discussed below, in reality this
has not happened in recent "mega-merger" cases in both the U.S. and the EU.
127. See U.S., EC Commission Forge Antitrust Cooperation Accord, supra note
125, at 375. To enable the other party's views to be taken into consideration, the
agreement calls for the parties to notify the other party "far enough in advance" about
any enforcement activities that may affect the other's interests and to specify when it
should occur. Each party is to also provide the other party with information about
anticompetitive activities that could violate the other's antitrust law. Id.
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Agreement still allows the parties full discretion in deciding whether or
not to take any enforcement action, either under positive comity, when
the party has been requested to do so, or under the coordination and
comity provisions in Article VI.'
Therefore, the effectiveness of the U.S./EC Agreement is
questionable, given that the parties still have full discretion to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction of their respective antitrust laws. Indeed, the
process and results of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas as well as the
Ciba/Sandoz mergers seem to provide further evidence that in reality,
the concepts of positive comity and comity incorporated in the U.S./EC
Agreement have not been very effective in preventing disputes or
enhancing coordination in antitrust matters.
1. FTC's Approval of the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz Merger
In March 1996, two European pharmaceutical giants, Sandoz and
Ciba-Geigy, announced their plans to merge and form a new company,
Novartis 9  The EU Competition Commission expressed initial concerns
128. U.S./EC Agreement, supra note 18, arts. V 4 & VI, at 1498-1500. See also
Walker, supra note 126, at 589-90. Walker observes that although article VI requires
each party to take into consideration the other party's important interests in all stages of
enforcement activities, article VI only requires this consideration "to the extent
compatible with its own important interests." Id. at 589 (citing U.S./EC Agreement,
supra note 18, art. VI). As a result, in Walker's opinion, this provision "adds little that is
innovative or binding." Id. at 590.
Perhaps an indication that the positive comity provisions needed to be strengthened
was the approval by the European Parliament in April, 1998, of a new agreement which
"fleshes out provisions on 'positive comity"' in article V of the 1991 U.S./EC
Agreement. EU Parliament Backs Agreement With U.S. on Competition Cooperation, 15
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 611 (April 8, 1998) [hereinafter EU Parliament]. The
agreement is called "Agreement between the European Communities and the
Government of the United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity
Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws." Proposed U.S.-EU Pact
Calls for More Cooperation in Competition Cases, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at
1161 (July 2, 1997) [hereinafter Proposed U.S.-EU Pact]. The European Commission
views the new draft as "an important step forward from Article V ... as it not only
provides guidelines on how positive comity requests should be dealt with, it raises a
presumption that in certain circumstances a party will normally defer or suspend its own
enforcement activities." EU Parliament, supra, at 611. However, it is important to note
that this new agreement does not cover merger investigations, such as the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger. Proposed U.S.-EUPact, supra, at 1161.
129. See USA: Pharmaceuticals-Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz, Reuter Textline, Dec.
19, 1996, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Ecnews file. Both companies are based
in Switzerland, which is not part of the European Union. See EU Clears CIBA/Sandoz
Deal After Licencing Move, The Reuter Eur. Community Rep., July 17, 1996, available
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and started an investigation into the merger which would create the
world's second largest pharmaceutical firm, because there were several
sectors where the activities of the two companies overlapped.
Specifically, the EU Commission was concerned with the overlapping in
the areas of pharmaceuticals, crop protection, and animal health, and
stated its concern that the new company's combined research and
development potential would "far exceed all other competitors."'13 The
EU Commission's concerns were serious enough that it was believed the
Commission would put conditions on the merger in return for its
clearance, 3' and there were discussions between Sandoz and Ciba-Giegy
and the Commission regarding possible solutions to make their merger
compatible with EU competition rules. 32
The European Commission ultimately cleared the merger in July (two
months ahead of the scheduled decision) after the two companies agreed
to grant non-exclusive licenses for an animal anti-parasite product, even
though the merger would affect 100 specific markets in the areas of
human health, animal health, plant protection products, and seeds.'33
Despite the Commission's initial concern about the two companies'
combined research and development potential far exceeding a
competitor and thus possibly foreclosing the gene therapy sector, the
Commission still concluded that there was little likelihood for future
market dominance in that sector13
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission, however, took a much "tougher
line" in its review of the merger than the EU Commission. The FTC
was especially concerned that the merger would create the number one
in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Ecnews file; see also Urwin, supra note 1, at 14. However,
because the turnover of the two companies exceeded the threshold within the European
Economic Area (EEA), the EU Commission was obligated to review the negative impact
on competition and to either modify the terms of the merger or refuse authorization of
the merger if the Commission's concerns were not met. See Peter O'Donnell, True
Love's Path ... The European Union (EU) announces a research probe into this co and
Sandoz/Ciba-Geigy merger, 16 PHARMACEUTICAL ExEcUTIVE 40, 41-42 (June 1996),
available in LEXIS, Busfm Library, ABI file.
130. EU Starts Full Probe Into Sandoz/Ciba Deal, The Reuter Eur. Community
Rep., May 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Ecnews file.
131. See id. After its preliminary probe into proposed merger, the European
Commission found that there were a number of sectors where the two companies'
activities overlapped, particularly in pharmaceuticals, crop protection, and animal health.
As a result of its findings, the European Commission decided to start a full probe into the
deal, which increased the likelihood that the Commission would impose conditions
before approving the merger. See id.
132. See EU Discussing Remedies to Sandoz/Ciba Deal, The Reuter Eur.
Community Rep., July 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Ecnews file.
133. See Commission Set to Give Conditional Approval for Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz
Merger, Eur. Rep., July 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Ecnews file.
134. See EU: EU/Competition - Conditions for Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz Merger, Reuter
Textline, July 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Ecnews file.
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company in world crop protection and the number two company in seeds
and animal health.'35 The FTC was also concerned about the merger's
effect on the gene therapy sector, where both Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz
136
were major players.
The FTC finally approved the merger, but only after requiring several
conditions, such as the licensing of certain gene therapy patents and
technology to a French competitor, as well as substantial divestitures in
the herbicide and pet flea-control market.'37 In fact, the divestiture of
Sandoz's corn herbicide business to the Germany company BASF for
$780 million was one of the largest divestitures that the FTC had ever
ordered.'38 The FTC also barred Novartis from acquiring any new patent
rights for gene therapy products, from re-entering the U.S. flea-control
market for six years, and required Novartis to obtain FTC approval of
any acquisitions in the U.S. market for ten years. 9
In comparing the approvals of both the EU Commission and the FTC,
although they had similar concerns with regards to market share
dominance in the same particular sectors, the respective responses and
conditions were quite different. Judging by the conditions and
requirements which the FTC imposed on Novartis, it gave little
135. See William Hall, Ciba, Sandoz in US Deal to Speed Merger, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1996, at 11, available in LEXIS, World Library, Fintme file. For
example, in the U.S. corn herbicide market, Ciba controlled more than thirty-five percent
of the market, and Sandoz had approximately ten percent of the sales. The FrC was
concerned because both companies had pursued strategies in the past which limited
generic competition even after the expiration of patents on the products, and because
development and testing of such products could take more than a decade. Ciba and
Sandoz were also the leading sellers of flea control products for pets in the United States,
including pills, collars, shampoos, sprays and foggers. See FTC Settles Challenge to
Merger of Ciba-Geigy, Sandoz, NAT'L ASS'N OF ATr'YS GEN. ANTITRUST REP.,
Mar./Apr. 1997, at 8, 9 [hereinafter FTC Settles].
136. See Novartis Has New Roadblock, CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., Sept. 30,
1996, at 9. Prior to the proposed merger, Sandoz had acquired Genetics Therapy Inc.,
and Ciba held a forty-nine percent share of Chiron. See id. The acquisition of these
holdings in other gene therapy companies strengthened the status of Ciba and Sandoz as
being two of only a few companies which are capable of commercial development of
gene therapy products. The FTC was concerned that because entry into the gene therapy
market could take up to twelve years, the patents held by Ciba and Sandoz would
severely limit the capability of any competitors to enter the market. See FTC Settles,
supra note 135, at 9.
137. See Woellert & Kaplan, supra note 8, at B6. See also supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
138. See Felix Bauer, Regulators Approve the Creation of Novartis, GLASGow
HERALD, Dec. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
139. See FTC Settles, supra note 135, at 9.
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consideration to the analysis and evaluation of the EU Commission's
approval of the merger.
2. EU Commission's Approval of the Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas Merger
Just as the FTC imposed major conditions on the Ciba/Sandoz merger
for approval despite the EU Commission's earlier and relatively
unconditional approval, so too did the EU Commission impose
conditions on Boeing for approval of their merger with McDonnell
Douglas, despite the FTC's unconditional approval.' 4 The contentious
and acrimonious approval process by the EU Commission of the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger came after Alexander Schaub, the
number two man in the EU Competition Authority, pledged that the EU
would coordinate the analysis of the merger with the U.S., and that the
EU would "do everything to come to identical views with American
authorities [the FTC] on objections to the deal and... look into possible
remedies.' 4'
Despite this pledge and the subsequent unconditional FTC approval,
the EU pressed for several concessions from Boeing to address the EU's
concerns. The EU's concerns reflected a marked distinction in its anti-
competition analysis from that of the FTC. While the FTC ruled that the
merger would not "substantially lessen competition in any relevant
market,"' 142 the EU expressed several concerns, including that the
dominant position which the enlarged Boeing would have in the
commercial aircraft market would make it difficult for Airbus Industrie
to effectively compete. 43 Another major competition concern the EU
had was with Boeing's exclusive twenty year supplier contracts with
both American and Delta Airlines, which the EU believed would harm
competition by locking out any sales to these airlines by Boeing's
competitors (i.e. Airbus) for twenty years.i4 The EU sought concessions
'41from Boeing to address these and other concerns.
140. See discussion supra Part I.
141. EU to Coordinate Boeing Analysis with US - Schaub, The Reuter Eur.
Community Rep., June 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Ecnews file.
142. Dahlburg, supra note 2, at 41.
143. See West, supra note 4, at BI. Airbus "feared" the 20-year exclusive contracts
Boeing had with airline companies because in practical terms, an airline would be
reluctant to begin carrying the additional costs involved in bringing in new plane types
after moving to an all-Boeing fleet over a period of 20 years. See Bryant, supra note 14,
at D5. Jean Pierson, managing director of Airbus, expressed Airbus' concern by stating
"[e]xclusive deals are not for 20 years, they are for eternity." Id.
144. See West, supra note 4, at B1. See also Stanley Holmes, Condit Rejects EU
Merger Concerns, SEATrIE TIMES, May 22, 1997, at El.
145. Other EU concerns included: 1) As the new supplier of spare parts to existing
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Just as Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz had to make major concessions, so did
Boeing. Specifically, Boeing had to make the following concessions
right before the deadline in order to gain the EU Commission's
approval: 1) Boeing agreed not to enforce the twenty-year exclusivity
clauses with American, Delta and Continental Airlines, and refrain from
entering into any similar agreements until 2007; 2) the civilian airliner
division of McDonnell Douglas was to remain a separate legal entity for
ten years; 3) Boeing was to license out patents obtained from McDonnell
Douglas' government-funded military contracts and cross-license
blocking patents to other airline manufacturers; and 4) Boeing made a
commitment not to leverage customer service and support arrangements
with existing McDonnell Douglas customers in a way that would
unfairly promote Boeing aircraft, or abuse relationships with parts
suppliers that would force them away from their relationships with other
airline makers.
1 4 6
3. Effectiveness of the U.S./EC Agreement in the Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas and Ciba-Sandoz Mergers
As discussed in Part IV, one of the main intentions of the U.S./EC
Agreement was to provide for coordination and agreement about which
jurisdiction should take the lead in investigating a particular matter, in a
way that each party would "conduct its enforcement activities ... insofar
as possible, consistently with the enforcement objectives of the other
party."' 47  This did not take place in the Boeing merger. Indeed,
throughout the dispute with the EU Commission, Boeing argued that the
FTC should have been given the lead role under the U.S./EC
Agreement.' 4' However, the EU Commission argued that because it was
empowered to rule against a deal which creates or strengthens a
dominant market position in the EU, the agreement did not cover this
merger.
149
There was also little evidence of consideration of the other respective
McDonnell Douglas customers, Boeing would use its position to pressure them to buy
Boeing jets or punish them if they bought from Airbus. See Pearlstein & Swardson,
supra note 5, at Cl. 2) The potential for public money earmarked for defense research
and development from McDonnell Douglas' defense operations benefiting Boeing's
commercial aviation business. See West, supra note 4, at B 1.
146. See Merger Control, supra note 7.
147. U.S./EC Agreement, supra note 18, art. IV 3, at 1499.
148. See Torres, supra note 14.
149. See id.
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party's rulings on the particular mergers. In both the Boeing and
Ciba/Sandoz mergers, the FTC and EU Commission's analyses were far
apart in their respective conclusions about anti-competitive concerns. In
the end, the FTC found little concern about Boeing, a U.S. company, but
major antitrust concerns about Ciba/Sandoz, European companies. The
EU Commission's concerns were directly opposite, with little concern
about Ciba/Sandoz (despite strong initial public concerns), 5 ' and major
concerns about Boeing. In reviewing the results of these two particular
merger cases, it appears that each antitrust authority protected its own
national interests.
The wide disparity between the findings of the FTC and EU
Commission in both merger cases also indicates a lack of cooperation
with, or at least consultation with, the other party's analysis of the
proposed mergers' antitrust concerns. After the EU approval of the
Boeing merger, Boeing Chairperson Phil Condit again publicly
expressed his regret that the EU Commission did not give "greater
deference to the [FTC]" which had prime jurisdiction and had approved
the merger unconditionally.' It is interesting to note that Karl Van
Miert, the European Competition Commissioner who had been so
vocally opposed to the merger during the approval process, publicly
spoke out after the EU approval and expressed the need to improve
"transatlantic cooperation" on such cases in the future. He even went so
far to suggest that a separate organ within the World Trade Organization
should be established to deal with international mergers.'52
The effectiveness of the U.S./EC Agreement in view of the results of
the Boeing and Ciba/Sandoz mergers is questionable. Although the
agreement calls for cooperation, coordination, and consultation in both
enforcement activities and avoiding conflicts, the inherent weakness of
the agreement is that there is no binding obligation on either party to
comply with requests, or to take into consideration the other party's
interests.'53 Although certainly the goals of the agreement are
150. Perhaps political concerns played a part in the EU's approval of the
Ciba/Sandoz merger as well. Switzerland applied for membership to the EU in May
1992, but its application has been frozen due to the Swiss voters' rejection in December
of 1992. Given Switzerland's geographical position within the EU, its significance as a
trading partner with EU members, and the necessity of many EU producers to transit
across Switzerland, the EU maintains interest in Swiss membership and has been
receptive to Swiss government overtures. However, negotiations between the EU and
Switzerland remain delicate and strained. See David Phinnemore, New and Aspiring
Members of the European Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION HANDBOOK 77, 78-81
(Philippe Barbour ed., 1996).
15 1. Merger Control, supra note 7.
152. Id.
153. See U.S.IEC Agreemen; supra note 18, art. V & art. VI, at 1497-1500. Article
V, paragraph four provides that: "Nothing in this Article limits the discretion of the
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worthwhile to pursue, it does not have the necessary enforcement to be
effective in cases such as the Boeing merger, in which sensitive interests
of both parties are substantially affected.
V. THE AFERMATH OF THE BOEING-MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
MERGER: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF COMITY IN RESOLVING
EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST JURISDICTION?
Under the concept of positive comity espoused in the U.S./EC
Agreement, the European Union, concerned about the harmful effect of
the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger on the business of Airbus in the
United States and other countries, could have requested that the United
States prevent or rescind the merger under its own antitrust laws.' 4 In
reality, of course, this did not occur, nor could one expect the United
States to comply with such a request, given the vital economic and
military interests which the United States claimed were involved with
the merger.' Likewise, the FTC, rather than requesting the EU
Commission to address the FTC's concerns over the Ciba/Sandoz
merger, made its own independent findings which resulted in much more
substantial conditions being placed on the merger than the EU
notified Party under its competition laws and enforcement policies as to whether or not
to undertake enforcement activities with respect to the notified anticompetitive activities,
or precludes the notifying Party from undertaking enforcement activities with respect to
such anticompetitive activities .... " Id. art. V 4, at 1498. Article VI states: "Within
the framework of its own laws and to the extent compatible with its important interests,
each Party will seek.., to take into account the important interests of the other Party."
Id. art. VI, at 1498-99 (emphasis added). See also Walker, supra note 126, at 590. With
no binding obligation, Walker argues that:
[The]commitment to coordination and comity thus leaves both parties free to
act independently, and allows the jurisdictional conflicts which led to the
Agreement to be raised once again. Without any restriction on the activities of
the parties, the United States may continue to exercise jurisdiction in Europe
under the "effects doctrine," and the European Community can exercise
jurisdiction in the United States.... [The Agreement] fails to create any
binding rule that sets forth specific jurisdictional boundaries.
Id. at 590-91.
154. See U.S./EC Agreement supra note 18, art. V & art. VI, at 1497-1500. See
also Walker, supra note 126, at 590.
155. See Pearlstein & Swardson, supra note 5, at Cl. Prior to the final decision by
the European Commission, top officials from the Department of Justice and the Pentagon
flew to Brussels to emphasize that the Clinton administration "would not tolerate undue
interference in the operations of an industry crucial to the economic and military strength
of the United States." Id.
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Commission imposed.' 6 As one European commentator observed about
positive comity: "It would be hardly realistic from a political point of
view to presume that one of the parties would start proceedings only for
the benefit of the other party, independently of the question whether the
laws of the parties would permit such an action." '57
The concepts of positive comity and the comity considerations of the
other party's interests have also been eroded by the Hartford Fire
decision and 1995 DOJ Guidelines which adopted Hartford Fire in the
United States, and by the Wood Pulp decision in the EU."' Both the
U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice in their
respective decisions have converged their respective approaches in
determining extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction to the effects test, 59 and
both courts have rejected comity considerations absent a true conflict.'
60
The recent EU Commission ruling on Boeing, the FTC ruling on
Ciba/Sandoz, and the court decisions in Hartford Fire and Wood Pulp,
are strong indications that neither a national court or antitrust authority
can effectively conduct a comity consideration analysis and thus, cannot
act as a neutral mediator between the conflicting policies of two
countries. 6' In addition, both judicial and antitrust enforcement agencies
also appear to be shifting from comity considerations to "realpolitik"
considerations and the protection of their respective economic self-
interests.
VI. VIABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR RESOLVING
DISPUTES IN EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF ANTITRUST LAWS
In addition to the U.S./EC Agreement, the United States has bilateral
antitrust cooperation agreements with Australia, Canada, and Germany.
There have also been multi-lateral efforts, mainly through the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
156. See supra Part IV.B.1.
157. Allard D. Ham, International Cooperation in the Anti-Trust Field and in
Particular the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Commission of
the European Communities, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 571, 594 (1993). Mr. Ham
opined when he wrote his article in 1993 that the positive comity provision in the
U.S./EC Agreement would be utilized infrequently. Id.
158. See Alford, supra note 102, at 228-29.
159. See discussion supra Part M.B.3-4. and accompanying notes.
160. See Shank, supra note 119, at 174. See also Alford, supra note 102, at 228.
161. See Michael Tepass, Resolving Extraterritoriality Conflicts in Antitrust: Two
Case Studies and Proposals of Solution, 5 CONN. J. INT'L L. 565, 620 (1990). Tepass
states that courts can only assert or decline its national jurisdiction. As a result, the court
rejects the other side's substantive policy by either applying national laws or by
declining jurisdiction. It is for this reason that national courts cannot act as a neutral
mediator. Id. at 620.
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which has adopted guidelines, and there have been proposals for
establishing an international code for antitrust law as well. The OECD
guidelines and bilateral agreements with both Australia and Canada have
been viewed as relatively successful, and perhaps can serve as models to
build on for future bilateral or multi-lateral agreements. These bilateral
antitrust cooperation agreements with Australia, Canada, and Germany,
as well as the OECD Guidelines, will each be examined separately
below.
A. U.S./Australia Accord on Antitrust Enforcement
The United States and Australia entered into an antitrust cooperation
agreement in 1982, after the friction caused by the antitrust suit in In re
Uranium Antitrust Litigation,6 2 which involved Australian uranium
companies and challenged Australian government policies implemented
by the uranium industry.1 63 The agreement requires both countries to
notify and consult with each other to resolve conflicts in antitrust laws,
and to resolve such conflicts based on comity considerations and mutual
respect for each country's sovereignty. t"
The agreement allows for each country to request consultations with
the other if the other country adopts an antitrust policy or action which
may have implications for the requesting country's antitrust laws or
national interests.'6  The agreement requires both parties in such
consultations to give "due regard to each other's sovereignty and to
considerations of comity."'" The United States is also required to notify
the Australian Government about any antitrust investigation which may
162. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
163. Id. See also U.S., Australia Sign Agreement to Cooperate in Antitrust Matters,
43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1071, at 23 (July 1, 1982) [hereinafter U.S.,
Australia].
164. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Australia Relating to Cooperation of Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, 21
I.L.M. 702 (1982) [hereinafter U.S./Australia Agreement]. According to U.S. Attorney
General William French Smith, the agreement was "rightly characterized... as a
breakthrough." Australian Attorney General Peter Durack stated that it had been his
government's desire to protect its trade laws and policies, and that despite the sharp
divergent views and potentially conflicting goals of the parties when the negotiations
began, the accord "recognizes the right of each country ultimately to take whatever
action it deems necessary to protect its interest." See U.S., Australia, supra note 163, at
23.
165. U.S./Australia Agreement, supra note 164, art. 2 1-2, at 703-04.
166. Id. art. 2 5, at 704.
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affect Australian laws, policies, or interests before the commencement of
any investigation or action.' 7 Australia, on the other hand, has the
option to notify the United States if it adopts a policy that may have
consequences for the United States, and before the policy is
implemented if possible.'
What is unique about this agreement, compared to other bilateral
agreements of the U.S. (which all incorporate the doctrine of comity), is
that the U.S./Australia Agreement mentions specific interests of each
country and requires both countries to give mutual recognition of each
other's interests, and to give "the fullest consideration" to modifying a
policy or action that may harm the specified interests of the other
country.'69 The defined interests of the United States to which Australia
must give full consideration are the enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws
and the interests protected by U.S. antitrust laws. 70  The interests
delineated for Australia which the U.S. must give full consideration to
are any interests related to the exportation of Australian natural
resources, manufactured goods, or produced goods.'7'
167. Id. art. 1 2-4, at 703.
168. Id. art. 1 l 1, 3, at 703.
169. Id. art. 2 1 6(a), (b)(1)-(4), at 704-06. See also Tepass, supra note 161, at 612-
13.
170. U.S./Australia Agreement, supra note 164, art. 2 6(a) at 704-05. Article 2
paragraph 6(a) provides that:
[T]he Government of Australia shall give the fullest consideration to
modifying any aspect of the policy which has or might have implications for
the United States in relation to the enforcement of its antitrust laws. In this
regard, consideration shall be given to any harm that may be caused by the
implementation or continuation of the Australian policy to the interests
protected by the United States antitrust laws ....
Id.
171. Id. art. 2 6(b), at 705. The U.S. must give full consideration to modify or
refrain from any antitrust investigations or proceedings which relate to activities that:
1) [were] undertaken for the purpose of obtaining a permission or approval
required under Australian law for the exportation from Australia of Australian
natural resources or goods manufactured or produced in Australia;
2) [were] undertaken by an Australian authority, being an authority established
by law in Australia, in the discharge of its functions in relation to the
exportation from Australia of Australian natural resources or goods
manufactured or produced in Australia;
3) related exclusively to the exportation from Australia to countries other than
the United States, and otherwise than for the purpose of re-exportation to the
United States, of Australian natural resources or goods manufactured or
produced in Australia; or
4) consisted of representations to, or discussions with, the government of
Australia or an Australian authority in relation to the formulation or
implementation of a policy of the government of Australia with respect to the
exportation from Australia of Australian natural resources or goods
manufactured or produced in Australia.
Id. art. 2 6(b)(1)-(4), at 705-06.
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In addition to notification provisions which provide a means to resolve
potential conflicts before friction occurs, the agreement also allows for
the Australran government to request the U.S. government to participate
in a private antitrust litigation that is related to a subject of notification
and consultation. If requested, the U.S. Government must report the
substance and results of the consultations regarding the subject of
antitrust litigation to the court."' Such participation by the U.S.
government helps to facilitate resolution of potential conflicts by
providing information to the courts which would allow for more
educated considerations of comity."
The U.S./Australia Agreement has been considered successful by both
governments to the extent that in 1997, both countries entered into a
tentative "first-ever" Mutual Antitrust Assistance Agreement, which
provides for each country to exchange evidence, witnesses, and
information needed in each other's antitrust investigations. 74 This
proposed agreement came about from the close relationship built
between antitrust enforcement agencies of both countries since the 1982
U.S./Australia Agreement.175  The U.S./Australia Agreement has been
observed as a model for future agreements because, unlike other
agreements, it states the defined interests of each country in specific
areas and requires mutual recognition and full consideration of those
interests.176
B. U.S./Canada Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement
In 1995, the United States and Canada entered into a new antitrust
172. Id. art. 6, at 708. This provision was very important to the Australian
government, especially after the United States government had refused to participate in
the uranium cartel antitrust case. See Tepass, supra note 161, at 613 n.238.
173. See Tepass, supra note 161, at 613.
174. U.S., Australia Propose First-Ever Mutual Antitrust Assistance Agreement, 72
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1807, at 386 (Apr. 17, 1997).
175. Id.
176. See Tepass, supra note 161, at 623. Tepass argues for the effectiveness of the
U.S./Australia Agreement by using the dispute between the U.S. and Australia over the
uranium cartel in the In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation as an example. This conflict
was determined for the most part by Australia's interests in exploiting and exporting its
natural resources. Under the U.S./Australia Agreement, the U.S. has agreed to consider
this specific interest of Australia when deciding to apply antitrust laws to businesses that
have contacts with Australia. At the same time, the recognition of Australia's defined
interest in exporting natural resources under the Agreement does not prevent U.S.
antitrust action against other Australian export cartels. Id. at 623 (citation omitted).
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agreement which replaced a previous non-binding memorandum of
understanding from 1984.' Similar to the U.S./Australia Agreement,
the agreement with Canada also provides for each country to provide
early notification regarding any "enforcement activities that may affect
important interests" of the other country in order to prevent conflicts.
1 8
The procedures and timetables for notification regarding different types
of antitrust investigations are specifically delineated in the agreement.171
The U.S./Canada Agreement incorporates comity considerations for
the purpose of minimizing any conflicts caused by antitrust enforcement
actions of either country.' 0 Each party is required to give "careful
consideration" to the other party's "important interests" in all phases of
the investigation and enforcement, including the decisions regarding the
initiation and scope of any investigation or proceeding.'8 ' If one party's
enforcement activities may adversely affect the important interests of the
other party, then that party is required to consider all "appropriate
factors" in assessing what measures a party will take. The agreement
sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors, which both parties should
consider.'82
177. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada Regarding the Application of Their Competition and Deceptive
Marketing Practice Laws, Aug. 3, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 309, 311 (1995) [hereinafter
U.S./Canada Agreement]. The new agreement's emphasis is on law enforcement
cooperation, built on the success that U.S. and Canadian antitrust authorities previously
had in joint criminal investigations of price fixing. Provisions of the agreement include
notification, cooperation and coordination of enforcement activities, conflict avoidance
and consultations, application to certain consumer protection laws, and limitations on
confidentiality and use. See U.S., Canada Sign Cooperation Agreement Covering
Competition, Deceptive Practices, 69 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1725, at
174 (Aug. 10, 1995).
178. U.S./Canada Agreement, supra note 177, art. II 1, at 313.
179. Id. art. II 3-9, at 313-15.
180. Id. art. VI 1, 4, at 318.
181. Id. art. VI 1, at 318.
182. Id. art. VI 5, at 318. The factors delineated in the U.S./Canada agreement
include:
1) the relative significance to the anticompetitive activities involved of conduct
occurring within one Party's territory as compared to conduct occurring within
that of the other;
2) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the
anticompetitive activities on one Party's important interests as compared to the
effects on the other Party's important interests;
3) the presence or absence of a purpose on the part of those engaged in the
anticompetitive activities to affect consumers, suppliers or competitors within
the enforcing Party's territory;
4) the degree of conflict or consistency between the first Party's enforcement
activities (including remedies) and the other Party's laws or other important
interests;
5) whether private persons, either natural or legal, will be placed under
conflicting requirements by both Parties;
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In addition, the U.S./Canada Agreement also includes a "positive
comity" provision, modeled on the U.S./EC Agreement.' If one party
believes that its important interests are being adversely affected by
anticompetitive activities in the territory of the other party, then a party
may request the other party's antitrust authorities to initiate "appropriate
enforcement activities."'4 Once a request has been made, the requested
party is required to "carefully consider" whether to initiate or expand
any enforcement activities."s  If any enforcement activities are
commenced, then the requested party must advise the requesting party of
the outcome and also, if possible, about any significant developments in
the enforcement process.'86
Similar to the U.S./EC Agreement however, the requested party has
full discretion in deciding whether to initiate or proceed with any
enforcement activities in accordance with the other party's request. In
addition, the requesting party under this provision is also not precluded
from proceeding with its own enforcement activities in response to the
specified anticompetitive activity."
It is interesting to note that these key features of the U.S./Canada
Agreement which replaced a memorandum of understanding are
modeled on key provisions of other bilateral agreements, namely the
positive comity of the U.S./EC Agreement, and the notification
provisions of the U.S./Australia Agreement. The U.S./Canada
Agreement also provides for coordination, cooperation and consultations
regarding enforcement, and requires semi-annual meetings to exchange
6) the existence or absence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered
or defeated by the enforcement activities;
7) the location of relevant assets;
8) the degree to which a remedy, in order to be effective, must be carried out
within the other Party's territory; and
9) the extent to which enforcement activities of the other Party with respect to
the same persons, including judgments or undertakings resulting from such
activities, would be affected.
Id. art. VI 5(i)-(ix), at 318-19.
183. U.S./EC Agreement, supra note 18, art. V 2, at 1498.
184. Compare U.S./Canada Agreement, supra note 177, art. V 2, with U.S./EC
Agreement, supra note 18, art. V 2. (The language of the article V provisions for
positive comity in both agreements is virtually identical).
185. U.S./Canada Agreement, supra note 177, art. V 3, at 317.
186. Id.
187. See id. art. V 4, at 317-18. Cf U.S./EC Agreement, supra note 18, art. V 4,
at 1498. (as with the positive comity provisions in both agreements, the language for
discretionary power of the parties to accommodate the other party's request for initiating
enforcement is virtually identical).
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information, discuss policy changes, and any other matters regarding the
agreement. 88
C. U.S./Gennan Antitrust Cooperation Accord
Signed in 1976, this is the United States' oldest written bilateral
agreement on antitrust cooperation and was intended to expand upon the
notification procedures for antitrust enforcement activities recommended
by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).' This agreement is mainly one of cooperation in the
exchange of information and with proceedings for antitrust and trade
regulation matters between the two countries. '
The agreement calls for both parties to "cooperate and render
assistance" to the other party's antitrust officials in relation to antitrust
investigations or proceedings, studies, and activities related to
competition policy, potential changes in antitrust laws, and to also
extend the same cooperation for activities related to restrictive business
practices by international organizations in which both countries are
members.' 9' Each party also agrees to provide any significant
information it may come across that may have a substantial effect on the
other party, and to also provide any information requested by the other
party relating to antitrust investigations, proceedings, and studies.'9
Each party may also request the other party to obtain for the requesting
party, information or interviews from a person or business within the
requested party's jurisdiction.'93 Both parties also agree to consult with
the other party in relation to coordination of any antitrust investigation
or proceeding which is related to or would affect either party, if
requested to do so. 94
The U.S./Germany Agreement incorporates comity considerations as
well.'95 Both parties agree within the bounds of their own laws, policies,
and interests, not to act in a way which would interfere with the other
188. U.S./Canada Agreement, supra note 177, arts. IV, VIII, IX, at 316-17, 320-21.
189. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation
Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, reprinted in [July - Dec.]
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 772, at D-1 (July 13, 1976) [hereinafter
U.S./Germany Agreement]. See also U.S.-German Antitrust Cooperation Accord
Signed, [July - Dec] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 771, at A-9 (July 6, 1976)
[hereinafter U.S.-German Antitrust].
190. U.S.-German Antitrust, supra note 189, at A-9.
191. U.S./Germany Agreement, supra note 189, art. 2 l(a)-(c), at D-1.
192. Id. art. 2 3, at D-1.
193. Id. art. 2 4, at D-1.
194. Id. art. 2 5, at D-1.
195. Id. art. 4, at D-2.
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party's antitrust investigation or proceeding. If one party's antitrust
enforcement activities are likely to adversely affect the "important
interests" of the other party, then the Agreement calls for that party to
notify the affected party and to "consult and coordinate" with that party
to the appropriate extent possible.'
96
An inherent weakness of this agreement, however, is that a party may
refuse to comply with requests for assistance or render assistance for any
of several reasons stated in the agreement.' 97 Each party can determine
whether compliance is either not possible or is inconsistent with its own
interests.' In addition, the parties are not obligated to employ
compulsory powers or undertake efforts that are an unreasonable burden
in providing information or assistance to the other party.' 9
D. OECD Recommendation Concerning Cooperation
Since 1967, the OECD has adopted recommendations for cooperation
between member countries on restrictive business practices affecting
international trade, and has periodically revised its recommendations
2
1
These recommendations have taken a more "pragmatic" approach by
providing for notification, exchange of information, and coordination of
antitrust enforcement activities by the member countries.2 ' The
recommendations have encouraged and served as a basis for agreements
between member nations.m
The most recent revised recommendations were adopted in 1995.'
The key features of the 1995 revisions are that they recognize positive
comity, and specify steps that countries should take in order to adhere to
196. Id. art. 4 1-2, at D-2.
197. Id. art. 3 1, at D-1.
198. Id.
199. Id. art. 3 2-3, at D-2.
200. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Revised
Recommendation of the Council Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries
on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade July 27-28 1995, 35 I.L.M.
1313, 1314 (1996) [hereinafter OECD Recommendations].
201. See P.M. Roth, Reasonable Extraterritoriality: Correcting the "Balance of
Interests", 4 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 245, 269 (1992).
202. See id. See also U.S./Germany Agreement, supra note 189, pmbl.;
U.S./Canada Agreement, supra note 177, pmbl. (both agreements cite the OECD
Recommendations in the respective preambles, and give "regard to" the OECD
recommendations).
203. OECD Recommendations, supra note 200.
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positive comity concepts.2 4 The OECD Recommendations also provide
a mechanism and forum for the mediation of disputes between member
countries which they cannot resolve on their own.05
In addition, the OECD Recommendations continue to recommend the
processes of notification, cooperation, and consultation based on the
principles of comity." Finally, the OECD Recommendations include
guidelines which specify procedures for notification, consultation and
cooperation in order to minimize or prevent conflicts in the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of antitrust laws. These guidelines are also
meant to clarify the procedures for a common understanding among the
member countries. 3
E. Draft International Antitrust Code
The Draft International Antitrust Code [hereinafter DIAC], is a
proposal that was presented to GATT in 1993 by Professor Wolfgang
Fikentscher and the International Antitrust Code Working Group, which
is a group of competition law scholars based in Munich.2 DIAC was
drafted and submitted for consideration by GATT [now WTO] members
as a Plurilateral Trade Agreement with a practical approach to
competition by providing rules for international trade and commerce,
rather than providing a theoretical model of competition.2 0  DIAC is
204. Id. at 1314-16. Article I.B.5(a) recommends that: "A Member country which
considers that one or more enterprises situated in one or more other Member countries
are or have been engaged in anticompetitive practices of whatever origin that are
substantially and adversely affecting its interests, may request consultation with such
other Member country or countries .... " Id. art. I.B.5(a), at 1316. Article I.B.5(c)
continues, by recommending that:
The Member country addressed which agrees that enterprises situated in its
territory are engaged in anticompetitive practices harmful to the interests of the
requesting country should attempt to ensure that these enterprises take
remedial action, or should itself take whatever remedial action it considers
appropriate, including actions under its legislation on anticompetitive practices
or administrative measures, on a voluntary basis and considering its legitimate
interests ....
Id. art. I.B.5(c), at 1316.
205. Id. art. I.B.8, at 1316. The OECD recommends that the disputing member
countries, if they agree, should have "recourse to the good offices of the Competition
Law and Policy Committee with a view to conciliation." Id.
206. Id. pmbl., art. I, at 1314-15.
207. Id. app., at 1317.
208. Id.
209. Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade
Agreement, July 10, 1993, reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628,
at S-1 (Special Supplement) (Aug. 19, 1993) [hereinafter DIAC]. See also Wolfgang
Fikentscher, The Draft International Antitrust Code ("DIAC") in the Context of
International Technological Integration, 72 CHi.-KfNT L. Rmv. 533 (1996).
210. DIAC, supra note 209, Introduction Part VII, at S-4 to S-6. See also
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based on five principles which include establishing minimum standards
through an international agreement for national antitrust laws, and
providing procedures for both an international body and the parties to
the agreement to ensure the effectiveness of international trust law."
DIAC provides minimum standards for the national laws of the parties
for major areas of competition laws, including price-fixing and
distribution strategy agreements, mergers and acquisitions, and state-
authorized cartels.2 According to Professor Eleanor M. Fox of the New
York University School of Law, and one of the members of the DIAC
drafting group, any country party to this agreement would have to
"adopt, in accordance with its constitution, the measures necessary to
ensure the effective application of this Agreement."23 A party could
also enact stricter laws then the minimum established by the
International Code."4 Professor Fox provides the example that if the
United States became a signatory to such an agreement, it would have to
eliminate its statutory exemptions for export cartels, because they would
not conform to the international code."'
Perhaps the key provisions in the DIAC for ensuring compliance
among the parties is the establishment of two international
organizations, one for ensuring compliance and the other for resolving
disputes. DIAC would establish the International Antitrust Authority to
ensure that the national laws of the parties based on the minimum
standards of the International Code are enforced. 6 This international
authority would have broad powers and the authority to: 1) bring actions
against national antitrust authorities in that nation's courts if the
authorities refuse to take appropriate action; 2) sue private persons; 3)
sue a party to the agreement before the International Antitrust Panel; 4)
Fikentscher, supra note 209, at 535-37.
211. DIAC, supra note 209, Introduction Part VI, at S-6; Fikentscher, supra note
209, at 536-39. The DIAC summarizes the five underlying principles as providing for
(1) national, substantive law that grants (2) national treatment and provides for (3)
minimum standards and (4) international procedural initiatives which are (5) limited to
cross-border situations. Id.
212. DIAC, supra note 209, arts. 4,5, 8-13,16, at S-11 to S-17, S-19.
213. Id., art. 2 1 (a), at S-10. See also International Antitrust Code Will be
Studied by GAT Members, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259
(Aug. 19, 1993) [hereinafter International Antitrust Code].
214. DIAC, supra note 209, art. 2 2(a), at S-10. See also International Antitrust
Code, supra note 213, at 259.
215. See International Antitrust Code, supra note 213, at 259.
216. DIAC, supra note 209, art. 19 1, at S-20. See also Fikentscher, supra note
209, at 538-39.
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hold a right to appeal, even when the authority is not a party to the case;
and 5) assist parties with the enactment and enforcement of antitrust
la=.
217
The International Antitrust Panel would also be established to settle
disputes with legally binding decisions.2 Each party may bring an
action against another party before the panel, after the failure of
consultations between the parties and the International Antitrust
Authority.2 19 Not only are the panel's decisions legally binding, but if
the national court's decision is inconsistent with the obligations of the
agreement, then that court or the nation's authorities "have to reconsider
their decision respecting the findings of the International Antitrust
Panel."'
Thus, the DIAC would provide an international set of antitrust rules,
as well as an enforcement agency and dispute resolution mechanism and
forum on the international level. Such proposals are considered to be the
most ambitious in the area of international antitrust enforcement in
recent years. 22' As one commentator observed, "[T]he DIAC proposal is
probably premature given the nation state system of today where each
state jealously guards its sovereignty."'
F. Discussion
The above bilateral cooperation agreements, multilateral
recommendations, and plurilateral agreement proposals reflect the
217. See DIAC, supra note 209, art. 19 2, at S-20 to S-21; International Antitrust
Code, supra note 213, at 259.
218. See DIAC, supra note 209, art. 20 1, at S-21; International Antitrust Code,
supra note 213, at 259.
219. See DIAC, supra note 209, art. 20 [ 2, at S-21.
220. Id. art. 20 4, at S-21.
221. See International Antitrust Code, supra note 213, at 259 (Professor Fox, a
member of the DIAC drafting group herself, has urged a more "minimal approach"). See
Also, Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust: Against Minimum Rules; for
Cosmopolitan Principles, 43 THE ANTrrRUST BULL. 5 (1998) [hereinafter Fox,
International Antitrust]. Professor Fox has suggested a "pragmatic" solution of
"overarching framework principles that provide a discipline against nationalistic
measures, that keep enforcement at the national level, that require procedural vehicles
and safeguards to assure access to national courts, and that provide choice of law rules
where the significant antitrust effects are localized within one nation." Id. at 5-6. See
also, Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of The WTO
System, 44 DEPAtJL L. REv. 1097, 1110-11 (1995). An ABA proposal advocates an
agreement on basic principles among nations, without an international enforcement
agency. Id. (citations omitted).
222. Matsushita, supra note 221, at 1111. Mr. Matsushita goes onto comment that
perhaps in the future when globalization of economies reaches to the level such as the
EU, then there will be a need for a "supra-national" enforcement process similar to what
the EU currently has now (with the EU Competition Commission). Id. at 1111-12.
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growing awareness among nations of the necessity for the
internationalization of antitrust law. The bilateral cooperation
agreements which the United States has with the EU, Australia, Canada
and Germany have been successful in facilitating greater communication
and cooperation between the parties and have also produced some
concrete results in antitrust enforcement involving multinational anti-
competitive activities.
However, as the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger showed, such
bilateral agreements are ineffective in resolving the disputes where
strong national interests and the protection of vital industries are at
stake. Without a dispute settlement mechanism, it took extreme political
pressure and the threat of an all-out trade war to bring about the EU
approval. This is an inherent weakness in all four current bilateral
cooperation agreements which the United States is a party to, namely
that although comity considerations and cooperation procedures are
specifically incorporated, none of these agreements obligates the parties
to ultimately make antitrust enforcement decisions based on comity or to
comply with cooperation requests.2
In addition, "realpolitik" considerations, where each country protects
its own best interests in an increasingly competitive global economy,
will require a country to apply its own antitrust laws. Such
considerations will also compel countries to increasingly apply
extraterritorial jurisdiction of their antitrust laws when their interests are
adversely affected by what that nation perceives as anticompetitive
activities in another country.
For these reasons, the need for an international agreement providing at
least common guidelines for antitrust enforcement and more
importantly, a binding dispute resolution mechanism, is a valid one.
Indeed, the need for such a dispute resolution body has been recognized
on the international level. As discussed above, the OECD's most recent
Recommendations include procedures for OECD members to seek
resolution of unsettled disputes through the Competition Law and Policy
Committeem and the DIAC calls for both an enforcement agency and
dispute resolution panel with the authority to make legally-binding
decisions.22
Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the necessity and feasibility
223. See discussion supra Parts IV.A-B, VI.A-C.
224. See discussion supra Part VI.D.
225. See discussion supra Part VI.E.
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of an international agreement on antitrust enforcement and the
establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism is the agreement to
establish the World Trade Organization (WTO)f2 which annexes the
Uruguay Round Multilateral agreements on the Trade in Goods
(GATT), 7 and the Uruguay Round Understanding of Rules and
Procedures Governing The Settlement of Disputes (DSB).m Under the
WTO agreement, the Multilateral Trade Agreements are binding on all
members.29 These agreements have established international rules and
guidelines governing previous areas of international trade friction which
were very contentious and protectionist, such as agriculture, textiles,
intellectual property rights, as well as subsidies and dumping.m Without
the success of establishing the WTO, the world would have been subject
to damaging unfair trade practices, protectionism, and trade wars.2
3
1
The DSB established rules and procedures for a dispute settlement
226. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1140, 1144 (1994) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter
WTO Agreement].
227. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1154,
1154-55 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
228. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter DSB]. DSB is the
acronym for the Dispute Settlement Body. Id. art. 1 2, at 1226.
229. WTO Agreement, supra note 226, art. II 2, at 1144.
230. See, e.g., GATT 1994, supra note 227, at 1153. The Agreement on
Agriculture, Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Agreement on [Antidumping], and
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures were all incorporated as an annex
to GATT 1994 under the WTO Agreement. Id. The Uruguay Round Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights was also incorporated as an annex
under the WTO Agreement. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]. See also ERNsT-
ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 53 (1997). These
Multilateral Trade Agreements incorporated into the WTO Agreement "strengthen and
supplement the general GATT guarantees of trade and non-discrimination, especially
with regard to agricultural, textiles and 'grey area' trade restrictions... which have
escaped effective GATT legal disciplines for a long time." Id.
231. See PETERSMANN, supra note 230, at 45. The WTO Agreement was adopted
by 124 countries and the EU. In commenting on its importance, Petersmann opines that
the WTO Agreement is:
[T]he most important worldwide agreement since the UN Charter of 1945 ....
As a global integration agreement, which regulates international movements of
goods, services, persons, capital and related payments in an integrated manner,
the WTO Agreement reduces the current fragmentation of separate
international agreements and organizations for movement of goods, services,
persons, capital and payments.
1208
[VOL. 35: 1163, 1998] Antitrust Enforcement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
mechanism which leads to binding adjudicative proceedings.2 2 A key
provision for the success of and compliance with this dispute resolution
system is if a member does not comply with the DSB ruling, then that
nation becomes subject to unilateral trade retaliation by the injured
member(s), sanctioned by the WTO.23 Through the DSB, the WTO has
an effective mechanism to encourage the member nations to settle
disputes because the DSB is procedural, adjudicative, and binding.'
For example, it is interesting to note that during the initial forty-three
month period after the WTO DSB came into force in 1995, there were
139 consultation requests for dispute settlement."5 In comparison, there
232. DSB, supra note 228, arts. 1, 2 1, 4-9, 12, 15-20, at 1226-38. See also John
Weeks, Procedures for Dispute Settlement Under the World Trade Organization - GATT
1994 and Under Chapter 19 of The North American Free Trade Agreement, 18 HAmiLINE
L. REV. 343, 343-44 (1995). Briefly, under the WTO dispute settlement system, the
complaining parties can request that a dispute settlement panel be established if the
parties cannot reach an agreement within sixty days after a request for consultations with
the alleged injuring party. After the panel is established, it has six months to take written
submissions and oral arguments from the parties, and then submit a report to the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB). The panel's report must be adopted by the DSB unless there is
a consensus not to adopt the report. Under a standing Appellate Body there is an
appellate review process which cannot exceed ninety days. The Appellate Body's
decision must also be adopted by the DSB, unless there is a consensus not to do so. If a
member nation is found to be in violation of an obligation under GATT, then that nation
must indicate its plans to remedy the violation and/or comply with the panel report's
recommendation. See Weeks, supra, at 343-44. See also Matsushita, supra note 221, at
1100-01.
233. DSB, supra note 228, art. 22 E 2-3, at 1239-40. Article 22 provides that if a
member country has failed to comply with the DSB rulings, or has failed to provide
satisfactory compensation, then "any party having invoked the dispute settlement
procedures may request authorization of the DSB to suspend" the concessions and
benefits of the WTO Multilateral Trade Agreements applied to that member. Id. art. 22
2, at 1239.
234. See, e.g., Matsushita, supra note 221, at 1100-01. The dispute settlement
process under the WTO is a "judicial process" which establishes an "international trade
tribunal" which adjudicates disputes between member states. Id. at 1100 n.31.
235. Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes (last modified July 27, 1998)
<http:/www.wto.orglwto/disputelbulletin.htm>. In addition to encouraging members to
utilize the DSB system for the settlement of disputes, another important factor for the
future success of the WTO's dispute settlement system is whether member nations that
are major economic powers will comply with a DSB binding decision. In an early case
under the new DSB system, the United States, in what was viewed as a sign of positive
support for the WTO DSB system, complied with a DSB recommendation in 1997. See
Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes, supra. In a complaint by Costa Rica, the
DSB had found that a U.S. measure which restricted textile imports from Costa Rica
violated obligations under GAIT, and recommended that the measure be repealed. After
losing on appeal, the U.S. complied with the DSB recommendation by letting the
measure expire one month after the Appellate Board Report, and not renewing the
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were a total of 196 disputes submitted for settlement over a period of
forty-six years from 1948 to 1994, under the previous 1947 GATT
236Agreement system.
As a result of the successful establishment of the WTO and its trade
agreements, there would be several advantages to establishing an
international agreement on antitrust enforcement through the WTO. The
WTO is an international body that has 124 member nations and an
established framework to enforce compliance;. 7 therefore, an antitrust
agreement within the WTO would automatically cover the vast majority
of trading nations.38 In addition, the WTO and its GATT Agreements
have proven to be successful in establishing international agreements
based on procedures and rules of law for very difficult and contentious
trade areas, such as agriculture and intellectual property.2 9
It is interesting to note that Professor Fox has suggested a multilateral
agreement that focuses on "a cosmopolitan framework, procedures and
comity .... along the lines of TRIPsm [Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property]."' Although Professor Fox does not
believe that an international agreement of substantive antitrust rules is
measure after it had expired. Id.
236. See PEIERSMANN, supra note 230, at 74 n.7.
237. See id. at 45.
238. Indeed, the EU has formally proposed to develop an international framework
of competition rules to be incorporated under the WTO Agreement. See PEMArmNN,
supra note 230, at 222-23 & nn. 41-42. The EU proposal emphasizes the need for
making the substantive law and procedures under any such competition and antitrust
framework to be enforceable through the WTO dispute settlement system. See id. at
223. By incorporating an international competition rules agreement under the WTO
dispute settlement system, the EU argues that competition sanctions and trade sanctions
could be authorized to enforce compliance. See id. There have also been legal studies
which have examined the feasibility of settling disputes over international competition
and antitrust rules through the WTO dispute system. See id. at 223 & nn. 43-44. In
addition, the WTO itself, at the first WTO Ministerial Conference in December 1996,
established a WTO working group to study the interaction between trade and
competition policy. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATr/WTO DIsPUTE
SETrLEMENT SYSTEM 98 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997).
239. See PETERSMANN, supra note 230, at 64-65. Petersmann argues that the WTO
dispute settlement system can serve as a model for international adjudication:
[The] international legal guarantees of economic freedom, non-discrimination
and rule of law, such as those in GATTIWTO law, have... extended, for the
benefit of individual citizens and consumers, liberal constitutional principles to
the ever more important area of economic policy-making of governments ...
As international relations are increasingly determined by economic relations,
this change from power-orientated "diplomatic" to rule-orientated "legal"
methods of foreign policy-making and dispute settlement, and the worldwide
acceptance of a compulsory dispute settlement system as part of the WTO
Agreement, are an important new development in international law.
Id.
240. TRIPs, supra note 230.
241. Fox, International Antitrust, supra note 221, at 8-9.
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feasible,22 she suggests that a possible solution would be to have an
"overarching framework of principles," with procedures similar to those
provided in the TRIPs Agreement to protect harmed nations.243  in
addition, Professor Fox also suggests that dispute resolution be
available, but limited, as in the TRIPs Agreement, to provable breaches
of the multilateral agreement obligations. 4
Although some commentators do not believe that an international
antitrust agreement or code is feasible given the inclination of each
country to protect its own self-interests,. 5 other commentators have
called for incorporating an international antitrust agreement either within
the WTO because it has an internationally agreed-upon and enforceable
dispute settlement system already in place, or through some other
multilateral agreement.2 6
242. See id. at 7-8.
243. Id. at 5, 8-9. These procedures are included within the ten points that
Professor Fox suggests should be incorporated in a multilateral agreement. The
procedures, similar to those found in TRIPs include:
[An] opportunity for harmed nations to complain to domestic authorities, and
protocols... established for cooperation in discovery and enforcement .... [in
addition] the importing nation should be obliged to provide an accessible
litigation system accompanied by the safeguards of due process, as recourse
for harmed nations and persons ....
Id. at 8-9.
244. See id. at 9.
245. Id. at 8 (observing that "if homogeneity of substantive rules were a good idea,
it is an idea that is unlikely to be achieved."). Professor Fox believes that there are
"contextual differences" in the antitrust laws of the industrialized nations and in the
interests of developed and developing countries which are "resistant to harmonization."
As a result, Professor Fox believes that "there is no wisdom in trying to negotiate
common antitrust rules, let alone minimum rules en route to ... a complete set of world
substantive rules." Id. at 7-8. See also Tepass, supra note 161, at 620-23 (advocating
bilateral agreements modeled on the US/Australia Agreement which gives mutual
recognition and full consideration to defined and limited economic interests of the
parties, rather that international antitrust agreements or codes which "provide only
unsatisfying solutions to extraterritoriality conflicts."). Id. at 621; Spencer Weber
Waller, Antitrust and American Business Abroad Today, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1251,
1284-87 (1995) (urging that the WTO consider the role of harmonizing fundamental
norms and procedures which would "harness each country's own self interest as a tool
for progress," rather than an international code which would favor some countries and
burden others).
246. See, e.g., Matsushita, supra note 221, at 1115. Matsushita believes that one
advantage of including an international competition code in the WTO Agreement is that
coordination between competition policy and other policies within the WTO Agreements
such as with anti-dumping, intellectual property, and safeguards would be easier than if a
competition code would be established separately from the WTO. See id. Matsushita
observes that because anti-competitive practices can offset the benefits of the
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VII. CONCLUSION
In 1995, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice, Diane P. Wood, in commenting on the
internationalization of antitrust law stated: "[a]ntitrust law must take its
place in international markets... [The question we face today] ... is
how best to go about making antitrust an effective tool to protect
competition in international markets." 7
The issue of extraterritorial application of antitrust laws has become
an increasingly contentious one between countries as merger activity
grows between multinational corporations, and as nations seek to protect
their own markets and economic interests. With the globalization of
markets, the conduct of multinational corporations usually brings about
concurrent jurisdiction between two or more countries where the
corporation's conduct has an effect. As a result, national courts and
governments have attempted to provide an approach to govern the
extraterritorial application of national antitrust laws.
In the past, U.S. courts have utilized the doctrine of comity, which
recognizes and balances the interests of the foreign jurisdiction, to
temper extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws.4 Both bilateral
and multi-lateral agreements to which the United States is a party have
also incorporated the concept of comity. By taking into consideration
the other nation's interests in determining which jurisdiction's antitrust
laws should be exercised, these agreements attempt to provide an
approach through which concurrent antitrust jurisdictional disputes can
be resolved.49
However, comity considerations, including positive comity, although
ideal in concept, have become less influential in preventing and certainly
resolving disputes over the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws.
liberalization of trade in goods and services brought about by WTO, it is necessary to
have an international antitrust policy to preserve the effectiveness of the WTO
Agreements. See id. at 1103. See also Alford, supra note 102, at 230:
A solution might also be found in recent initiatives to codify, in a multilateral
convention, the extraterritorial reach of antitrust laws in light of international
comity considerations .... Such cooperation may now be needed, for, as
Judge Fitzmaurice admonished in Barcelona Traction, international law
obligates every state to "exercise moderation and restraint as to the extent of
[its] jurisdiction[,]" so as to "avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more
properly appertaining to ... another State." (citation omitted).
Id. See also P.M. Roth, supra note 201, at 268 ("[An] international agreement is
undoubtedly the most satisfactory way of avoiding jurisdictional conflicts.").
247. Diane P. Wood, Address Before the DePaul Law Review Symposium [on]
Cultural Conceptions of Competition: Antitrust in the 1990's (Feb. 3, 1995), in 44
DEPAuLL. REv. 1289, 1298 (1995).
248. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
249. See discussion supra Part IV.A, VI.A-D.
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National courts and antitrust enforcement agencies in both the United
States and Europe have come to reflect the realpolitik national interests
of protecting domestic markets and key industries. Rather than seeking
to resolve conflicts in antitrust laws by using a comity analysis to
determine whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be exercised, the
exercise of antitrust jurisdiction is now determined on the basis of
whether the extraterritorial conduct has an effect on the nation's market.
Comity is utilized only if there is a "true conflict" between the laws of
the concurrent jurisdictions .
As discussed above in Part V of this Comment, the dispute over the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger was a poignant example of the
ineffectiveness of international agreements which incorporate the
doctrine of comity, but lack enforceable guidelines or a dispute
settlement mechanism. Comity considerations and positive comity
incorporated in the U.S./EC Agreement did not even come into play
during the review of the Boeing merger by the FTC and the EU
Commission. Instead, both the United States and the EU Commission
applied their own antitrust laws and analysis. Without a dispute
settlement mechanism, it took extreme political pressure and the threat
of an all-out trade war to bring about the EU approval.
There is evidence that an international agreement for antitrust
enforcement is feasible. For example, the WTO has successfully
reached agreements in previously difficult and contentious trade areas
and practices. More importantly, the WTO has also successfully
established an international enforcement authority and binding dispute
settlement system. Given the established framework of the WTO and
GATT Agreements for liberalizing international trade and limiting
protectionist and anti-free trade practices, it would be logical to
incorporate an antitrust enforcement agreement within the WTO to
protect the achievements of the multi-lateral trade Agreements. 2 '
The dispute over the Boeing merger between the U.S. and EU antitrust
authorities was a bruising one. With the continued globalization of
markets and corporations, there is also a likelihood of similar disputes in
the future with other trading partners. Given the aftermath of the Boeing
dispute and the likelihood of future conflicts in national antitrust laws,
the argument for an enforceable international agreement on antitrust
250. See discussion supra Part lII.B(2)-(4).
251. See Matsushita, supra note 221, at 1115. See also supra note 241 and
accompanying text regarding Matsushita.
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enforcement, combined with a binding international dispute settlement
system, is a compelling one.
BRIAN PECK
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